What we said in October — and what happened
The verdict held; the weak spot we named is the one that cracked
On 2 October we published Palantir at $190.04 with a verdict we rarely give a business we admire: pass. We said revenue was growing 93% and accelerating, that the margins and the customer economics were among the best in software, and that none of it mattered at about 74 times sales, a price that assumed about 32% growth a year for a decade. We said we would begin near $110, where 25% a year would earn a buyer about 10%, and that "the price can halve again on a change of mood". The shares closed at a record $209.05 a week later and at $143.49 on 20 November. Here is the account.
| What we said on 2 Oct | What happened by 20 Nov | Grade |
|---|---|---|
| 'Pass at $190; begin near $110' | −24.5%; the low was $142.28 on 20 November, still 29% above $110. | ✓ Right so far |
| 'The price can halve on a change of mood' | −32.6% from the 12 October intraday high in six weeks, with no bad news except bookings. | ✓ Right, in progress |
| Growth accelerating (Q2 +93%) | Q3 +96%, a ninth acceleration; but the Q4 guide implies +88%, the first slowdown in ten quarters. | ✓ Right; Q4 too early |
| Backlog '$4.9bn, small for the valuation'; contracts terminable | Backlog (RPO) flat at $4.9bn; contract value booked +6%; US commercial +11%. The market's stated reason on results day. | ✓ Right — it cracked |
| Net dollar retention 157%; 1,049 customers | Q3: 165%; 1,090 customers, +20% (from +24%), from transcripts. | ✓ Right |
| Gross margin 85% | Q3 83.4%, as cloud hosting costs rose $135m in a year. | ◆ Slipping |
| Insiders sold ~$1.2bn in 2025, ~$0.7bn in 2026 | Re-summed from 134 Form 4s: correct. 2026 now $772.5m, with ~$176m more filed as proposed sales. | ✓ Right |
| Government risk: stopgap to 11 Dec, midterms | The midterm result produced the period's worst day, −9.7% on 5 November. | ✓ Right |
Our errors. None changed the verdict, but six details were wrong or loose when we wrote them. We showed company buybacks in 2025 as nil; they were about $75m, still a token. We called Peter Thiel a director; Thiel is Chairman. Our analyst split ("13 buy, 10 hold, 3 sell") came from a block in our feed that contradicts the feed's own history, which shows far more buy ratings. We gave the cash pile as $9.4bn in one place and $9.2bn in another; both figures are in the filings, but they measure different things and we should have used one. A chart caption said the 2026 guide was $8.2bn while the arithmetic used $8.15bn. And price to sales was 74 times, not 73. Every insider-sale total and every second-quarter number we re-checked was correct.
★ Up 95%, then down 31%
A record in October, a rout in November
| Date | What happened | PLTR that day |
|---|---|---|
| 9 Oct | Record close after broker upgrades (Barclays initiated at Overweight, as reported). | +5.2%, $209.05 |
| 16 Oct | No company news; doubts about AI funding hit software shares (as reported). | −7.2% |
| 30 Oct | A week of disappointments from Alphabet, Amazon and Intel; no Palantir news. | −6.3% |
| 3 Nov | Q3 results: beat and raise, but contract value booked +6% and backlog flat; shares −8% before the open, −1.7% at the close. | −1.7% |
| 5 Nov | Democrats win both chambers in the midterms; defence and AI shares sold (TIKR). | −9.7% |
| 19 Nov | Anthropic's listing; Palantir up 8.7% during the day, then down. | −1.9% |
| 20 Nov | AI sell-off: Nasdaq −5.3%, Nvidia −14%; no Palantir news (Yahoo, Bloomingbit). | −6.6%, $143.49 |
Mostly the market, partly the business. Of the seven big days, one was about Palantir's own numbers, and it was the smallest. The midterms cost more in a day than the results did in three, and the last week was the AI trade unwinding across the board: over the month, ServiceNow fell 41% and Datadog 39%, against Palantir's 25%, according to Yahoo. Consensus earnings estimates for 2026 to 2028 rose 5–10% while the price fell. Everything that went wrong was the price of the shares, not the profits of the company.
That is the classic setup for a value investor, with one difference: the price was so high to begin with that a 31% fall from the record leaves it where it was in early August. In June the shares were $107. We said in October that a change of mood could halve the price, and the mood has changed only part of the way.
What would finish the job is unknowable in advance: a weak fourth quarter, a government shutdown in December, a larger supply of insider shares, or simply more weeks like the last one. What would reverse it is equally unknowable: a strong quarter of bookings, or a return of appetite for AI shares. We do not try to predict either. We set a price at which the business, on generous assumptions, earns a buyer 10% a year, and wait for it. The price has moved a long way towards that level in seven weeks; it can move the rest of the way as quickly, or not at all.
★★ Revenue accelerated; bookings did not
The weak spot we named in October is the one that cracked
On 2 November Palantir reported third-quarter revenue of $2.31bn, up 96%, well ahead of its own forecast of about $2.16bn. US commercial revenue grew 148% to $984m and, for the first time, exceeded US government revenue. The operating margin was 47% on the reported measure and 62% on the adjusted one. The company raised its 2026 revenue guide to $8.53bn and its adjusted free-cash-flow guide to $4.8–5.0bn. By any normal standard it was an exceptional quarter.
But a company's revenue tells you what it delivered; its bookings tell you what it will deliver. The total value of contracts signed in the quarter grew only 6%, after 49% in the second quarter. In the US commercial business, the engine of the story, contract value grew 11%, after 153%. Remaining performance obligations, the backlog the company must report, were flat at $4.9bn. The finance chief said, according to the call transcript, that several large "Sovereign AI" deals had been signed for shorter periods than usual, and that size and duration should grow. That may be true. But in October we pointed to this exact number as the thin part of the case, and it is the number that moved the wrong way.
| Q3 2026 | Value | vs a year earlier |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $2,313m | +96% (+20% on Q2) |
| US commercial / US government | $984m / $953m | +148% / +96% |
| Operating margin, reported / adjusted | 46.9% / 61.7% | Rule of 40: 158% |
| Free cash flow | $1,197m | 52% of revenue |
| Total contract value / US commercial contract value | $2.92bn / $1.46bn | +6% / +11% |
| Remaining performance obligations | $4.9bn | Flat on Q2 |
| Q4 guide | $2.65bn revenue | +88% (first slowdown in ten quarters) |
Why it matters at this price. A company that is growing at 96% does not need bookings to grow at 96% in every quarter; deals are lumpy. But the market is paying for many years of very high growth, and the consensus already expects 2027 revenue of about $13.2bn, 55% above this year. Revenue a year from now comes largely from what is signed today. If the fourth quarter shows contract value and backlog growing strongly again, the third quarter was a pause. If it does not, the 2027 consensus is too high, and so is the price. Palantir's own guide for the fourth quarter, +88%, is still extraordinary; it is also the first step down after nine steps up.
The other backlog measure. Palantir also reports "remaining deal value", which counts the full value of contracts including options customers have not yet exercised and periods they may cancel. It is a generous number, and we said in October that it assumes every option is taken up. Even on that generous measure, the third quarter was quiet: total remaining deal value of about $13.4bn grew 2% on the quarter, and the US commercial part 4%, after 27% in the second quarter. Two measures, one strict and one generous, telling the same story is worth more than either alone. A further small item points the same way: contracts with customers in which Palantir itself invested, about $326m in total, have no remaining options and will stop contributing revenue after this year.
The customers: deeper, slower to arrive
Existing customers spend more; new ones come more slowly
The customer numbers tell the same two-sided story. Existing customers are spending more than ever: net dollar retention rose to 165% from 157%, and the twenty largest customers spent an average of $146m each over twelve months, up 76%. New customers are arriving more slowly: 1,090 in total, up 20% after 24%, and the US commercial count grew 5% in the quarter. The business is getting deeper faster than it is getting wider. That is the profile of a product customers love and of a market that is not yet as large as the price assumes.
Costs are rising underneath. Gross margin fell to 83.4% from 84.7% in the second quarter, because cloud hosting costs rose $135m in a year; Palantir has committed to at least $5.6bn of cloud spending over ten years. Stock-based pay rose 85% to $319m in the quarter. And two small details deserve a footnote: receivables grew 27% in the quarter against revenue growth of 20%, and Palantir received about two million shares of Surf Air Mobility in September "as payment for certain outstanding receivables", taking its stake in that customer to 8.5%. Neither is large. Both are the kind of thing an owner should watch in a company growing this fast.
Concentration, and what it means. The three largest customers provided 16% of revenue in the first nine months, and have been with Palantir for fifteen years on average; no single customer exceeds 10%. Depth of this kind is a strength while those customers keep expanding, and it is why net dollar retention can rise while the customer count slows. But it also means that a large part of the growth comes from a few hundred organisations spending more each year, and an organisation that has already doubled its spending twice will not double it forever. At some point the growth has to come from new customers, and the third quarter is the first in which that point looked further away rather than closer.
| Customer measure | Q2 2026 | Q3 2026 |
|---|---|---|
| Net dollar retention | 157% | 165% |
| Top-20 customers, average revenue (12 months) | $124m (+67%) | $146m (+76%) |
| Customers / growth | 1,049 / +24% | 1,090 / +20% |
| Gross margin | 84.7% | 83.4% |
| Rest of world revenue growth | +34% | +26% |
The government, after the midterms
41% of revenue, a new Congress and a funding deadline
The US government provided 41% of Palantir's third-quarter revenue, and that revenue grew 96%, from existing programmes and new awards, according to the finance chief. The Army's TITAN programme and the Maven system, which now has more than 100,000 users across the services according to the technology chief, are the flagships. We found no new defence award dated October or November.
On 5 November the shares fell 9.7% after the Democrats won both chambers of Congress. The fear, as reported by TIKR, was the defence budget: the White House asked for $1.5tn for 2027 against $901bn approved, and Jefferies expects about $1.15tn. Even the lower figure would be a large increase. The more specific risk for Palantir is scrutiny. In October we noted a $243.9m no-bid Pentagon award; a new Congress with oversight committees in opposition hands is more likely to ask about such awards. And the government's stopgap funding was due to expire on 11 December; Palantir's 10-Q says continuing resolutions and lapses in funding "have and could in the future" delay its government revenue.
Patronage cuts both ways. In October we wrote that Palantir's closeness to the current administration was an asset that could become a liability. The midterms did not change who runs the Pentagon, but they changed who funds and oversees it. A company whose government revenue is growing at 96% is visible, and visibility attracts questions: about no-bid awards, about the use of its software in military operations (Part XII), about its work for immigration enforcement. None of these has produced a finding against Palantir. Each is a reason why government revenue, which looks like the steadiest part of the business, may carry more political risk than its contracts suggest. For an owner the sensible response is not to guess at politics but to demand a price that does not depend on them.
| Government item | Status | Read |
|---|---|---|
| US government revenue, Q3 | $953m, +96% | ✓ Strong |
| Defence budget for 2027 | $1.5tn requested; ~$1.15tn expected (Jefferies, as reported) | ◆ Still rising |
| Stopgap funding | Due to expire 11 December (as reported in September) | ◆ Watch |
| UK NHS data platform | Reported kept to March 2029; successor tender from 2027 | ◆ Not guaranteed |
| Germany (Bundeswehr) | Award reported due by year-end | ◆ Open |
The moat, rechecked
Deeper with existing customers; the width is the question
| The claim (October) | Evidence now | Verdict |
|---|---|---|
| Switching costs: the software becomes the operating system | Net dollar retention 165%; the top three customers have been with Palantir 15 years on average. | ✓ Stronger |
| AIP turns AI models into products | US commercial revenue +148%; but contract value +11%. | ◆ Proven, slower to sign |
| Government trust and clearances | US government +96%; Maven open to all services. | ✓ Intact |
| Threat from AI labs and clouds | Anthropic now listed; the CEO calls the labs 'symbiotic' (transcript). No evidence of share loss. | ◆ Too early |
We keep the moat at 8. Customers who adopt Palantir spend more each year, and the old ones do not leave; that is the signature of a real moat. The question raised by the third quarter is not depth but width: how many organisations will adopt it, and how fast. The new-customer count and the bookings say the answer is "many, but not as fast as the share price needs".
- That revenue grows about 28% a year for ten years, to roughly $97bn in 2036, from $8.5bn this year.
- That the third quarter's weak bookings were a pause in signing, not the first sign of a smaller market, and the fourth quarter shows it.
- That operating margins stay near Microsoft's, despite rising cloud costs and stock-based pay growing faster than revenue.
The competition
A listed AI laboratory, a re-accelerating data platform, and Europe's own champions
| Rival | Where it meets Palantir | The latest | Read |
|---|---|---|---|
| AI laboratories (Anthropic, OpenAI) | Selling AI directly to companies. | Anthropic listed on 19 November; Palantir says it works with Anthropic. A sell-side analyst on the call claimed about half of Anthropic's customers buy directly (unverified). | ◆ Partner and rival |
| Snowflake, Databricks | Data platforms for AI. | Snowflake's product revenue accelerated to +37% and its backlog is $9.0bn, nearly twice Palantir's. | ◆ Growing |
| Anduril and defence primes | Military software. | Shares Army work with Palantir (TITAN production split, as reported). | ◆ Partner and rival |
| European providers | Sovereign data platforms. | Germany's domestic intelligence service chose ChapsVision; the Bundeswehr is testing alternatives (as reported). | ◆ Narrowing abroad |
Across our board. Two comparisons matter. Snowflake, a data platform that sells to many of the same companies, has a contracted backlog of $9.0bn, almost twice Palantir's, on revenue that is smaller; Palantir's contracts are shorter and more often terminable, which is one reason its backlog understates its revenue and one reason it is a weaker guarantee of it. And Anthropic's listing gives investors a pure AI laboratory to own for the first time. Some of the money that bought Palantir as the way to own AI can now buy the laboratory directly. That is a flow, not a fundamental, but at 47 times sales flows matter. Anthropic is expected to join the Nasdaq-100 in December, according to reports, which would require index funds to sell other members, Palantir among them.
Sovereign AI. Palantir framed its third quarter around "Sovereign AI": governments and national companies that want their own AI systems, run on their own terms, often on open-weight models rather than a laboratory's. That is a good market for a company that already holds security clearances in many countries, and it explains some of the shorter contracts. It is also the market in which European buyers are most inclined to choose a European supplier. International commercial revenue grew 21% in the quarter but barely moved from the second quarter, and international revenue is now only 16% of the total. Palantir's growth is, more than ever, an American story.
Management, insiders & capital allocation
Large awards, steady selling, and one plan to buy
Capital allocation. We lower the score from 5 to 4. Palantir has no debt, $10.6bn of cash and securities, and very little need for capital; the question is only what it does with its shares. On 28 October the board granted large new awards: 564,830 shares to the technology chief and 211,208 each to the finance chief and the chief revenue officer, worth roughly $111m and $42m each at that day's price; the terms were not disclosed in the filings. Stock-based pay grew 85% in the quarter, faster than revenue. Buybacks were $1.5m in nine months. Options, rights and restricted shares outstanding amount to about 8% of the share count. A company this profitable, issuing this many shares to its executives while the executives sell, is not treating its share capital as scarce.
Insiders. Sales so far in 2026 total $772.5m, with about $176m more filed as proposed sales on 19–20 November. Some of that is selling to pay tax on vesting shares, which is mechanical. The one counter-signal is the Thiel entity's plan to buy up to 4m shares. A purchase would be the first insider buying of any size we have recorded at Palantir. It has not yet happened.
The plans ahead. The 10-Q filed on 3 November lists the trading plans now in force. The chief executive's covers up to 7.08 million shares until June 2027, about $1.0bn at today's price; the technology chief's covers 1.45 million until May 2027; smaller plans cover the finance chief, the chief revenue officer and a director. Shares also vest every quarter, and the last two vesting dates, 20 August and 20 November, each brought a large sale to cover taxes. An owner should expect a steady supply of insider shares on the market for at least the next six months, whatever the price does. That supply is known and planned; it is not a signal about the business. But it is a reason why a falling price can keep falling for longer than the news would justify.
The numbers
A cash machine with no debt, and six faults in our feed
The quality is not in doubt. Over twelve months Palantir earned free cash flow of about $4.05bn on revenue of $7.29bn, a cash margin few software companies of any size have reached. It has no debt and $10.6bn of cash and securities. Two adjustments are needed before using its earnings. Stock-based pay, about $982m over twelve months, is a real cost; subtracting it leaves owner earnings of about $1.19 a share. And Palantir pays almost no tax (about 1% of pre-tax profit in the third quarter) because it still carries a full valuation allowance against its US and UK deferred tax assets; at a normal 23% rate, earnings would be about a fifth lower. When the allowance is released, reported earnings will jump once, and the jump should be ignored.
The multiple in history. Measured at each quarter-end since 2021, Palantir's price has ranged from 7 times trailing sales at the end of 2022 to 111 times in September 2025; the median is about 23 times. Today's 47 times is twice the median and close to where the shares stood in June 2026, when they were $107 and revenue was smaller. On earnings the picture is similar: about 100 times trailing earnings today, against 154 times in March and 93 times in June. The fall since October has taken the multiple from extreme to merely very high. It has not taken it anywhere near what investors in the best software companies have historically paid.
| What the screen shows | What is wrong, and the number to use |
|---|---|
| Market value $331bn; P/S 45.4× | Counts Class A shares only. All classes (2,409.5m): <b>$345.7bn</b> at $143.49, P/S <b>47.4×</b>. The same fault was in our October numbers' source. |
| Enterprise value snapshot | Dated 31 December 2025, with $229m of 'debt' that is lease liabilities. Palantir has <b>no debt</b>; EV about $335bn. |
| Net debt −$3.4bn (Q3) | Ignores $6.94bn of marketable securities. Net cash is about <b>$10.56bn</b>. |
| Non-operating income, Q2 −$169m, Q3 −$63m | Wrong sign and size: Q2 was <b>+$91.8m</b>, Q3 <b>−$25.8m</b>. The same kind of fault appears in our feed for Salesforce, Broadcom and Meta. |
| Government revenue, FY2021: $8,974m | Ten times too large: <b>$897m</b>, out of revenue of $1,542m. |
| Analysts: 17 buy, 9 hold, 3 sell | Contradicts the same payload's history (24 buy or strong buy, 9 hold, 3 sell or strong sell, in November). This produced the split we quoted in October. |
No dividend — and where the cash goes
A company that returns nothing, and pays its staff in shares instead
Palantir has never paid a dividend and has given no sign that it will. That is not a fault in a company growing at 90%: a business that can reinvest at very high returns should. But Palantir does not need to reinvest much. Its capital spending was $43m over twelve months, against $4.05bn of free cash flow, and the cash pile grew from $7.2bn at the end of 2025 to $10.6bn in September. The cash is not being reinvested, returned or used to offset the shares being issued to staff. It is accumulating and earning interest, $89m in the third quarter.
That is a reasonable choice for a company that values flexibility and serves governments, but an owner should see it clearly. Of every dollar of free cash flow, about 24 cents is matched by new shares issued to employees, and none is returned. An income investor has nothing here, and a value investor is being asked to accept dilution in return for growth. At 47 times sales, the growth has to be very large to make that a good trade.
| Use of cash, last twelve months | Amount | Read |
|---|---|---|
| Free cash flow | ~$4.05bn | ✓ Exceptional |
| Capital spending | ~$43m | Almost nothing to fund |
| Stock-based pay (non-cash, paid in shares) | ~$982m | ◆ +85% in Q3 |
| Buybacks / dividends | $1.5m (2026) / none | ◆ Token |
| Cash and securities | $7.2bn → $10.6bn (Dec → Sep) | Accumulating |
★ Valuation
A quarter cheaper than in October; the 25% path is still a long way down
Our method, unchanged. Palantir's price can only be judged by asking how fast it must grow. As in October, we start from the 2026 revenue guide, now $8.53bn, grow it for ten years, apply net margins as high as Microsoft's (40%) and an exit multiple of 30 times earnings, allow for 2% a year of dilution, and ask what a buyer earning 10% a year could pay today.
| Path | Revenue in 2036 | Value today | vs October |
|---|---|---|---|
| 20% a year | ~$53bn | ~$57 | $54 |
| 25% a year ◆ (our level) | ~$79bn | ~$117 | $112 |
| 27.6% a year (the price) | ~$97bn | $143.49 | — |
| 32% a year | ~$136bn | ~$202 | $193 |
What is priced in? At $143.49 the shares assume about 27.6% a year for ten years, revenue of roughly $97bn in 2036, about eleven times this year's, at Microsoft's margins. In October the price assumed about 32%. The fall has taken out about a third of the excess, not all of it. For comparison, the consensus expects 55% growth in 2027; even if that arrives, the following nine years would need to average about 25%.
Our level. Our rule for a business of this quality is that the level is where the price becomes fair, not where it becomes a bargain: the 25% path. Because the company raised its revenue guide, that path is now worth about $117, against $112 in October. We round it down to $115 for the bookings crack. At $115 the shares would trade at about 38 times trailing sales and 21 times next year's expected sales: still a premium price, for what is still one of the best businesses we have studied. Below the June low of $107 it would be a bargain.
How sensitive is the level? The 25% path depends on two generous assumptions: net margins of 40% in 2036 and an exit multiple of 30 times earnings. At a 35% margin the path is worth about $102; at 25 times earnings, about $98; at both, about $85. In the other direction, a business that kept growing at 25% for a decade would deserve more than 30 times at the end, and Palantir's margins are already above 40% on the adjusted measure. We keep the generous assumptions because the business has earned them. But it is worth seeing that the price of $143.49 is above the 25% path even on our generous terms, and well above it on ordinary ones.
Risks, lawsuits & controversies
Verified 22 November 2026 against the Q3 2026 10-Q and attributed reports
Legal. A securities class action (Cupat v. Palantir) was dismissed with prejudice in April 2025; the appeal was argued in March 2026 and the 10-Q of 3 November says it is still pending, and that no pending matter is material. We found no new securities suit or government investigation in 2026; notices of law-firm "investigations" are solicitations, not suits.
Controversy. Bloomberg reporting, as described by Foreign Policy Journal on 12 October, linked reliance on the Maven targeting system to a February 2026 strike on a school in Minab, Iran. Palantir's technology chief called the reporting wrong and pointed to likely human error, pending the official investigation. This is an unproven allegation; we record it because government reputation is part of Palantir's moat.
| Test | Today | What would change our mind |
|---|---|---|
| Q4 results, early February | Contract value +6%; backlog flat | Bookings and backlog growing strongly again would make Q3 a pause; another flat quarter would make the 2027 consensus too high. |
| The first 2027 guide | Consensus +55% | A guide well below the consensus would test the 25% path itself. |
| Government funding, 11 December | Stopgap | A shutdown would delay government revenue for a quarter; not a reason to change the level. |
| Insider Form 4s, late November | ~$176m filed as proposed | A purchase by the Thiel entity would be the first real insider buying signal. |
| Gross margin | 83.4% | Back to 85% would say the cloud costs were a step; lower would say they are a trend. |
| The price | $143.49 | Near $115 with bookings recovering: begin. |
In October I told you Palantir was one of the finest businesses I had studied and that I would not buy it at a hundred and ninety dollars. Seven weeks later the shares are at a hundred and forty-three. It would be pleasant to say I saw it coming. I saw that the price could fall a long way on a change of mood; I did not know when, and I still do not know where it stops.
The business did nothing wrong. Revenue grew ninety-six per cent, the company raised its forecast again, and customers who already use it are spending sixty-five per cent more than a year ago. Most of the fall came from outside: an election, a stumble at Nvidia, the listing of an AI laboratory that gives investors a new way to own the same idea, and a week in which the Nasdaq lost a tenth of its value.
But one thing did go wrong, and it was the thing I worried about. The value of new contracts signed in the third quarter grew only six per cent, and the backlog did not grow at all. Management says the deals were shorter, not smaller. Perhaps. A company priced for a decade of growth cannot afford many quarters in which it signs less than it delivers, and the fourth quarter will tell us whether this was one.
At a hundred and forty-three dollars the shares still ask for growth of about twenty-eight per cent a year for ten years. I would be glad to own Palantir if it delivered twenty-five, which is still an achievement almost no company of its size has managed, and that is worth about a hundred and fifteen dollars today. The company raised its guidance, so my level rises a little with it; the bookings crack, so I round it down. I would rather pay a fair price for the best than a hopeful price for the best, and the difference here is still a quarter of the share price.
Meanwhile the executives are selling, the board is granting them large new awards, and the company returns nothing to its owners. None of that is unusual in a young technology company. All of it is a reason to insist on the price.
— The Buffett Lens. A wonderful business at a falling price is still not a bargain until the price is.
Begin Near $115One of the best businesses we have studied, a quarter cheaper than in October and still priced for about 28% growth a year for a decade. ★ At $143.49 the price is above our 25% path of ~$117, within a range of ~$57 (20%) to ~$202 (32%). Begin near $115, the 25% path rounded down for the bookings crack. Q4 results in early February.
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