X-Ray Analyses›Technology›Oracle Corporation
X-RayNº 10618 November 2026
◆ Follow-upSecond X-Ray of Oracle Corporation. Our previous, dated 27 Sep 2026 at $137.10, concluded “Too Hard — Half the Backlog Is One Customer”. This report checks that call against what has happened since. Read it →
X-Ray Analysis◆The Buffett Lens
O

Oracle Corporation

NYSE: ORCL·Software — Infrastructure·United States·Explore ORCL live ↗

Oracle — the $20bn cap that lasted five days

◆ The Buffett LensIn September we called Oracle too hard and named $100 as the price at which we would look again. The shares have not reached it, but much has happened on the way. On 28 October Oracle promised to limit new capital raises through 2030 to $20 billion; on 2 November it raised all twenty at once. Leases signed but not yet started rose to $288 billion. A large customer is reported to be winding down a contract. And we found an error in our own arithmetic that changes what $100 means. Still too hard. The level moves to $90.
◆ Educational analysis & opinion — not investment advice. Figures as of 18 November 2026. See full disclaimer below.
7
Moat
3
Management & Capital
3
Financial Strength
9
Growth
7
Valuation
5.0
◆ The Scorecard · one-second read
"The promise was to raise no more than $20 billion. It lasted five days."
Investor Day cap: $20bn through FY30 · raised 2 Nov: $10bn shares at $116 + $10bn notes at 7.00–8.65% · leases not yet started $288bn · shares +8% since May · 14.1× FY27 · Q2 FY27 ~10 Dec
◆ Type · Cash franchise funding a leveraged bet, now with more leverageDividend · $2.00, flat, paid from financing — 1.7%★ Follow-up · our $100 level re-examined, and one of our numbers corrected
Price & total return · live
The Tape, since we wrote
The gold pin marks the price we used. Daily closes, live.
—
Drag across the chart to measure
Live price history is momentarily unavailable · price at this X-Ray: $115.06.
Go deeper — the Trading Desk, 15 years of financials, DCF & peers for ORCLOpen ORCL →
◆
Part
I

What we said in September — and what happened

Ten claims graded, two of them against ourselves

On 27 September we published Oracle at $137.10 under the title "Too Hard — Half the Backlog Is One Customer". We said the database business was a toll road and the AI cloud a leveraged bet on one customer's ability to pay; that the shares were not expensive but could not be priced; and that around $100, where we calculated the data centres would come at about 60 cents for each dollar they cost, we would look again. The shares closed at $115.06 on 17 November. Here is the account.

What we said on 27 SepWhat happened by 17 NovGrade
'The pace of financing surprises investors each time'It happened again, more starkly. On 28 October Oracle committed to limit new capital raises through fiscal 2030 to $20bn; on 2 November it raised the whole $20bn in one day.✓ Right
'A decade of buybacks reversed'86.2 million more shares sold on 2 November at $116. Shares outstanding: 2,880m in May, about 3,110m now, +8%.✓ Right, and worse
FCF −$23.7bn in FY26, worse in FY27Confirmed, and the first quarter's −$5.4bn was flattered: $11.4bn of operating cash flow was customer prepayments that carry a financing charge. Without them, about −$16.8bn.✓ Right
'Debt including leases: $156bn'Understated. Counting all leases on the balance sheet, $169bn at 31 August; about $179bn after the November notes. Our figure left out current and finance leases.✗ Too low
'$162bn of property; AI cloud priced at ~1.3× cost; ~0.6× at $100'Our error. $162bn included $34bn of leased assets; owned property and equipment was $127.8bn. On the right figure, the AI cloud was priced at ~1.7× cost at $137, and would be at ~0.9× at $100, not 0.6×. Part XI redoes the sum.✗ Wrong input
'1.9% above the 52-week low'Wrong, inherited from our feed: the 52-week closing low then was $114.99 (24 July), so $137.10 was 19% above it.✗ Wrong
'Roughly half of RPO is OpenAI (as reported)'Still not disclosed by Oracle. Its order book was $664bn at 31 August; the next figure comes with the second-quarter results, expected around 10 December.◆ Untestable
'Chips outlive contracts badly'Early evidence: Microsoft is reported to be winding down a 2023 deal to rent Oracle capacity built on an older generation of NVIDIA chips (Bloomberg, 6 November). Oracle says demand 'remains strong'.◆ Early signs
Founder 'owns two-fifths'Incomplete. The proxy filed two days before our report shows 38.2%, of which 413 million shares are pledged against personal borrowing, and a June plan to sell up to 50 million shares, cancelled on 12 September with none sold.◆ Missed detail
'$100: we would look again'Not reached: the low close since was $115.06 (17 November), the intraday low $109.21 (6 November). The level itself needs correcting; see Part XI.◆ Not reached

The grade that matters most is the one against ourselves on the property figure. Our September case for $100 rested on an arithmetic claim: that at that price the database business would pay for most of the share, and the data centres would come at about sixty cents on each dollar they had cost to build. The claim used a number from our own data feed that included leased assets with the ones Oracle owns. With the correct figure, $100 would buy the data centres at about ninety cents on the dollar. That is a discount, but not the one we promised. We correct it here, publicly, and we move the level.

Our September price → today
$137 → $115
−16.1% in seven weeks
From the 1 June high
−53.6%
$248.15 → $115.06
FY2027 EPS estimate
$8.14 → $8.15
unchanged; the multiple fell to 14.1×
◆
Part
II

★★ The cap that lasted five days

Investor Day's promises, and what Oracle did the following Monday

On 28 October, at its investor day in Las Vegas, Oracle set out the plan its shareholders had been asking for. Revenue of at least $225bn in fiscal 2030 (from $67bn in fiscal 2026), adjusted earnings of at least $21 a share, free cash flow positive in the second half of fiscal 2028 and at least $30bn in fiscal 2029, self-funding from fiscal 2029, and net debt below 3.5 times adjusted EBITDA by then. And it made a promise about money: it "committed to limiting additional capital raises through FY30 to $20bn", half in shares and half in debt, excluding refinancing. The shares rose 10.7% that day, to $144.54.

The next Monday, 2 November, Oracle raised all of it. It sold 86.2 million new shares at $116, 11% below the previous Friday's close, and $10bn of notes at coupons of 7.00% to 8.65%, between 2.4 and 3.35 percentage points above US Treasuries. The shares fell 8.8%.

Fourteen months of raising money$ billions raised in the capital markets, Sep 2025 – Nov 2026 (excludes leases and project loans).Senior notes, FY2026$43bnMandatory convertible preferred$5bnAt-the-market shares, Jun–Aug 2026$20bnNew shares at $116, 2 Nov 2026$10bnNew notes at 7.00–8.65%, 2 Nov 2026$10bnTotal ≈ $88bn28 Oct: 'limit additional capital raises through FY30 to $20bn'.2 Nov: all $20bn raised in one day (the two red bars). Shares fell 8.8%.The share countShares outstanding, millions.2,880m31 May 20263,024m31 Aug 20263,110mNov 2026+8% in six months★ A decade of buybacks ($36.6bn, $19.9bn, $21.6bn in FY19–21) is being reversed.Bar heights start at 2,700m. Sources: Oracle 10-K, 10-Q, 8-Ks and prospectuses (2 and 4 Nov 2026).
What Oracle promised on 28 OctWhere it stands on 17 Nov
New capital raises through FY30 capped at $20bnUsed in full on 2 November. Anything else must come from leases, vendor financing, customer prepayments or refinancing, all outside the cap and partly outside the debt line.
Gross debt broadly 'flat' after the new $10bnPro forma borrowings $135.3bn. Maturities of $7.2bn in fiscal 2027 and $10.1bn in fiscal 2028 must be refinanced.
Positive free cash flow in H2 FY28; ≥$30bn in FY29No interim free-cash-flow guidance for fiscal 2027. Capital spending of $90–95bn this year is reaffirmed.
Investment-grade ratings first, then the dividend, then growthRatings unchanged since July: Moody's Baa2 (negative), S&P BBB− (stable), Fitch BBB (stable). New bonds priced like a stressed investment-grade credit.
FY30: revenue ≥$225bn, EPS ≥$21, operating margin ≥40%Unchanged; the first test is the second-quarter report, expected around 10 December (date not yet confirmed by Oracle).

Two ways to read it. The charitable reading is that Oracle told investors exactly how much it would raise and then raised it promptly, while the window was open, removing the uncertainty in one stroke. The other reading is that a company which needs to say how little it will raise, and then raises all of it within a week at a discount and at 8% coupons, is telling you how expensive its money has become. We hold both readings. What we take from it is narrower: promises about funding from this management should be judged by what is done, not by what is said, and the capital markets have started to charge Oracle like a borrower rather than a software company.

◆
Part
III

★ The debt you see, and the commitments you don't

$288 billion of leases not yet started, and cash flow helped by customers' prepayments

The debt you see, and the commitments you don't$ billions at 31 Aug 2026 (borrowings pro forma for the November notes).Borrowings (pro forma)on the balance sheet$135.3bnLeases already startedon the balance sheet$43.8bnLeases signed, not yet started15–19 years; +$28bn in a quarter$288bnPurchase obligationsoff balance sheet$34.2bnPrepayments with a financing chargeinside operating cash flow$16bnCash and securitiesbefore the Nov proceeds are spent$37.1bn★ In September we said $156bn with leases. Counted fully: $169bn; $179bn after Nov.The $11.4bn of Q1 prepayments flattered operating cash flow: without them, Q1 FCF ≈ −$16.8bn.Sources: Oracle 10-Q for the quarter to 31 Aug 2026 (Notes 1 and 6), 10-K FY2026, 424B2 of 4 Nov 2026.

An owner of Oracle has to read three numbers that do not appear in the usual debt figure. The first is the leases signed but not yet started: data centres that developers are building for Oracle to rent for 15 to 19 years, from this quarter to fiscal 2029. They were $260bn at the end of May and $288bn at the end of August, $28bn more in a single quarter. When they start they will join the balance sheet as lease liabilities, and their rent will be a fixed cost whether or not the tenants underneath Oracle pay.

The second is customer prepayments. Oracle's operating cash flow of $23.1bn in the first quarter included $11.4bn of payments from customers that Oracle treats as carrying a significant financing component: in effect, customers lending Oracle money against future service, with interest accreting on it. That is a sensible way to fund a build, and better than a bond. But it means the reported cash flow was about $11bn better than the cash the business itself produced. Free cash flow without those prepayments would have been about −$16.8bn for the quarter, not −$5.4bn.

The third is the projects financed by others. Developers are borrowing tens of billions to build Oracle's sites, with Oracle as the tenant: reports put the loans at about $38bn for sites in Texas and Wisconsin, $16bn in Michigan and $18bn in New Mexico. None is Oracle's debt. All of it depends on Oracle's rent. In September Oracle sent a force-majeure notice to the developer of the New Mexico project over delays in getting power, reportedly to defer rent rather than to leave.

What the rating agencies watch. S&P has said, as reported by Reuters, that it would downgrade if leverage stayed above 4.5 times; Fitch's threshold is reported at 3.5 times EBITDA, or 4 times including rents. On our feed's figures, cleaned of a one-off gain, net debt is about 3.5 times EBITDA before the leases still to start. The next rating action is the single most important number for the shareholders, because it decides what Oracle's next dollar of debt costs.

AgencyRating and outlook (2 Nov 2026)Reported trigger for a downgrade
Moody'sBaa2, negativeLeverage could 'approach 5×' temporarily (as reported by Reuters)
S&PBBB−, stable (one notch above junk)Leverage above 4.5× for long; S&P sees a peak near 4.4× (Reuters)
FitchBBB, stableAbove 3.5× EBITDA, or 4× including rents (Reuters)
The marketNew notes at 7.00–8.65%, +240 to +335bpFive-year credit-default swaps hit 215bp in August, an 18-year high (Reuters); no November figure found
◆
Part
IV

What moved the shares

From $137 to $115 in seven weeks, and the intraday low of $109

DateWhat happenedORCL that day
24–25 SepForce-majeure notice to the developer of the New Mexico site over power delays (Reuters).$137.10
29 SepA director, Stephen Rusckowski, buys 25,000 shares at $139.35, the only open-market purchase by an insider.$137.79
14 OctA hot September inflation report lifts bond yields; worries about the New Mexico project.−8.8%
28 OctInvestor Day: fiscal-2030 targets, free-cash-flow timetable and the $20bn funding cap.+10.7%
2 NovAll $20bn raised: shares at $116 and notes at 7.00–8.65%.−8.8%
4 NovOracle reported (FT) to have cancelled a five-year chip lease worth about $7bn with Tencent after US officials raised concerns.−1.9%
5 NovMarket-wide sell-off in AI shares after the midterm elections.−6.9%
6 NovMicrosoft reported (Bloomberg) to be winding down its 2023 deal to rent Oracle capacity on older chips; intraday low $109.21.$116.10
11 NovCoreWeave's results ease fears about AI-infrastructure debt.+8.8%
16–17 NovAI and chip shares sell off ahead of NVIDIA's results.−5.0%, −3.4%

The pattern is that Oracle's shares now move on three kinds of news: its own financing, its customers' commitments, and the market's mood about AI spending. The first two are specific to Oracle and both went against it. The third is shared with every company on this list. An owner should notice that the only good company-specific day in the period was a day of promises, and that the promises were tested within a week.

◆
Part
V

The business, and what Oracle says a gigawatt earns

The first quarter, the second-quarter guide and the Investor Day economics

Cloud infrastructure (OCI)38%
$7.4bn in Q1 FY27, +121%. The AI rental business: data centres full of NVIDIA and other chips, leased or built, rented to AI laboratories and companies.
Cloud applications (SaaS)22%
$4.2bn, +10%. Fusion and NetSuite business software, sold by subscription.
Software licences and support29%
$5.55bn, −3%. The database toll road: very high margins, customers who almost never leave.
Hardware and services11%
$2.2bn: servers and engineered systems ($0.77bn, +15%) and consulting ($1.41bn, +5%).

The first quarter of fiscal 2027 (to 31 August), which we covered in September, brought revenue of $19.3bn (+30%) and adjusted EPS of $1.92. For the second quarter Oracle guided revenue growth of 30–34%, cloud growth of 65–71% and adjusted EPS of $1.85–1.93; reported growth in EPS looks negative only because the same quarter last year included a $2.7bn gain on Oracle's stake in Ampere. Results are expected around 10 December.

What a gigawatt earns, by Oracle's account. At Investor Day, management described a typical one-gigawatt AI project, according to the transcript: about $37bn of capital spending, just under half of the contract's value, a gross margin of about 35% and an operating margin of about 34% over the life of the contract. Vendor financing could cut the upfront capital by about half. Oracle expects about 10 gigawatts by the end of fiscal 2028. If those economics hold and the customers pay, the investment earns a respectable return. The two "ifs" are the whole question, and Investor Day did not answer either of them.

◆
Part
VI

★ The customers

One undisclosed giant, one reported retreat, one cancelled lease

OpenAI. Oracle still does not say how much of its $664bn order book belongs to OpenAI. Its annual report says no customer was 10% or more of revenue in fiscal 2024–2026, which is true and beside the point: the risk is in contracts that have not yet become revenue. Analysts still estimate about half. At Investor Day, Oracle's cloud chief said OpenAI had accepted capacity at the Abilene site "in less than 24 hours", a sign of demand. We found no news between our report and today of OpenAI changing what it has committed to pay.

Microsoft. On 6 November Bloomberg reported, via Reuters, that Microsoft is winding down a 2023 agreement to rent AI capacity from Oracle, because the capacity, built on an older generation of NVIDIA chips, no longer met its needs. Oracle replied that demand "remains strong", including for older chips; at Investor Day its finance chief said four-year-old GPUs were being renewed at premiums of about 20%. Both statements can be true. But the September report's worry, that chips become obsolete faster than the contracts that pay for them, now has a first data point.

Tencent. On 4 November the Financial Times reported that Oracle had cancelled a five-year lease of AI chips to Tencent, worth about $7bn, after US officials raised concerns. It is a reminder that some of Oracle's demand depends on Washington's permission as well as the customer's money.

Customer signalSince our reportWhat it tells an owner
OpenAI share of RPOUndisclosed; ~half by analysts' estimatesThe concentration is unchanged and still unpriced by Oracle's own disclosure.
Microsoft 2023 rental dealReported wind-down (6 Nov)Older capacity can lose its tenant before it is paid for.
Tencent ~$7bn leaseReported cancelled (4 Nov)Policy can remove demand overnight.
New Mexico (Project Jupiter)Force-majeure notice over power (Sep)Power, not chips, may set the pace of the build.
New contracts in Q1More than $30bn bookedDemand is real and still growing; the question is who pays, and when.
◆
Part
VII

The moat, rechecked — and the competition

The toll road is intact; the airport has more neighbours

The database moat is as wide as it was. Licence and support revenue shrank 3% in the first quarter, as customers move from licences to cloud subscriptions, but nobody is leaving: the multi-cloud database, Oracle running inside Microsoft's, Google's and Amazon's clouds, grew fastest of all, and management said at Investor Day that its "AI database" was growing more than 200%. This is the part of Oracle we would happily own at the right price, and nothing since September has narrowed it.

The cloud moat is narrower than ever, because the business has become a contest of capital. Amazon, Microsoft and Google are growing their clouds quickly from far larger bases and financing them from operating cash flow; Oracle finances its build with debt and leases. Newer rivals such as CoreWeave, whose third-quarter revenue grew 168% (as reported), compete for the same AI laboratories with even more borrowed money. Microsoft, meanwhile, has reportedly tightened its oversight of the smaller "neocloud" providers it rents from. In a market where customers are getting choosier about old capacity, Oracle's advantage is speed and willingness to build; its disadvantage is the cost of its money.

The claimEvidence since SeptemberVerdict
Database switching costsLicence and support −3%, multi-cloud database and 'AI database' growing fastest; no sign of customers leaving.✓ Wide, intact
OCI price and performanceMore than $30bn of new contracts in a quarter; GPUs renewed at ~20% premiums (management).◆ Real, but rented
Speed of build~10 GW targeted by end-FY28; power delays in New Mexico.◆ Fast, constrained
Cost of capitalNew notes at 7.00–8.65%; Moody's outlook negative; hyperscalers fund from cash.✗ The weak point
How knowable is the next ten years?
2/5 — the old half is simple; the new half depends on other people's balance sheets. We can describe the database business with confidence. We cannot know whether OpenAI and a few other AI laboratories will pay for what they have ordered, how fast chips will become obsolete, or what Oracle's money will cost in 2028.
What you must believe to buy at $115.06
  • That the large AI customers, OpenAI above all, pay for the capacity they have ordered over the next five years, so that most of the $664bn order book becomes revenue on schedule.
  • That Oracle can fund the gap to positive free cash flow in the second half of fiscal 2028 through leases, prepayments and refinancing without a further large share issue and without losing its investment-grade rating.
  • That fiscal-2030 earnings come in near Oracle's own target of $21 a share, so that today's price is about 5.5 times that number, and that the market then pays at least 12 times it.
◆
Part
VIII

Management, the founder and governance

Pledged shares, a cancelled sale plan, new grants, and one director who bought

L
Larry Ellison · Co-founder, Executive Chair and Chief Technology Officer
Owns 1.158 billion shares, 38.2% at the September record date (about 37% after the November issue), of which 413 million are pledged as collateral for personal loans; Oracle's policy allows pledging but not margin accounts. Adopted a plan on 22 June 2026 to sell up to 50 million shares; cancelled it on 12 September with none sold, saying there were no other plans to sell.
C
Clay Magouyrk & Mike Sicilia · Co-Chief Executives since 22 September 2025
Magouyrk built OCI; Sicilia ran the industry applications. Each received 446,197 restricted stock units on 15 October 2026, vesting from October 2027.
H
Hilary Maxson · Chief Financial Officer since 6 April 2026
Presented the Investor Day funding framework and the $20bn cap.

The founder's shares. Our September report described Ellison as owning about two-fifths of Oracle. It did not mention two facts in the proxy filed two days before we published: 413 million of those shares are pledged against personal borrowing, and in June, during the worst week for the shares since 2001, a plan was adopted to sell up to 50 million of them. The plan was cancelled in September before any were sold. We do not know the terms of the loans, and Oracle's policy rules out margin accounts, so a forced sale is unlikely. But an owner should know that the largest shareholder's wealth is partly borrowed against the shares an owner is buying, and that the founder considered selling at much higher prices than today's.

Capital allocation. We score management and capital allocation at 3, down from 4. The reason is not ambition; building Oracle into an AI cloud may prove a brilliant decision. It is the sequence: a funding cap announced and exhausted within a week, shares sold at $116 after a decade of buying them back at higher prices, and dividends maintained with borrowed and newly raised money. Governance: the annual meeting is today, 18 November; shareholders are voting on a proposal about preserving their own right to file proposals. A securities class action in Delaware alleges that Oracle misled investors about its AI financing; the claims are unproven, the motion to dismiss will be fully briefed on 18 December, and a separate suit by bondholders over the 2025 notes is pending in New York.

Who owns it
★ The founder
~37%, 413m pledged
Ellison's 1.158bn shares; a 50m-share sale plan adopted in June and cancelled in September with none sold.
Insiders
One buyer
Director Stephen Rusckowski bought 25,000 shares at $139.35 on 29 September, the only open-market purchase. Otherwise grants and tax withholding.
Analysts
Mean target ~$231
Our feed: median $225, range $95–325; 59 Buy, 24 Hold, 4 Sell. A year ago the average was about $348.
New shareholders
86.2m at $116
Bought in the 2 November offering, about 3% of the company, at a price now 1% above today's.
◆
Part
IX

The numbers

Cheaper on earnings, worse on cash, and six faults in our feed — two of which misled us in September

On earnings, Oracle is cheaper than in September: 14.1 times the fiscal-2027 estimate of $8.15 and 10.4 times fiscal 2028's $11.10, against 16.8 and 12.4 then. On cash, it is worse: trailing free cash flow of about −$28.7bn, a yield of about −8%, before counting the prepayments that flattered it. Interest cover is about 4.5 times. Cash and securities were $37.1bn at 31 August, plus about $19.8bn raised in November, most of which will be spent in the current quarter.

★ Six faults in our feed — read these before trusting a screen
What the screen showsWhat is wrong, and the number to use
Property and equipment $161.8bnIncludes $34.0bn of leased (right-of-use) assets. Owned property and equipment was <b>$127.8bn</b>. Our September valuation used the wrong figure (Part I).
Total debt $155.9bnBorrowings $125.3bn plus only part of the leases. All leases on the balance sheet are $43.8bn, so debt with leases was <b>$169.1bn</b>; about $179bn after November.
Market value $347.9bnUses a stale share count. With the 86.2m shares issued on 4 November, about <b>$358bn</b> at $115.06.
EV/EBITDA 12.4×; net debt/EBITDA 3.2×EBITDA includes a ~$2.7bn one-off gain on Ampere. Cleaned, about <b>13.8×</b> and <b>3.5×</b>.
Larry Ellison: 8,194 shares, 41.8% (Feb 2024)<b>1,158,375,174 shares, 38.2%</b> at the September record date, 413 million pledged (2026 proxy).
Dividend summary emptyFour payments of $0.50 in the last twelve months (<b>$2.00</b>).
◆
Part
X

The dividend

$2.00 a year, flat, and paid with money raised for other purposes — tested

Oracle pays $0.50 a quarter, $2.00 a year, a yield of 1.7%. It has not been raised since April 2025. In the first quarter Oracle paid $1.57bn of dividends while free cash flow was −$5.4bn; in effect the dividend was paid from the $20bn raised by selling shares. Oracle ranks the dividend second in its priorities, after keeping its investment-grade ratings and before growth.

★ Proving the dividend — six tests
TestEvidenceResult
1. Cover on free cash flowNone: trailing free cash flow about −$28.7bn against about $5.8bn of dividends.Fail
2. The trend of that coverNegative since fiscal 2025 and planned to stay negative until the second half of fiscal 2028.Fail, for now
3. From operations or from paper?From paper: new shares, notes and prepayments.Paper
4. Balance-sheet roomBorrowings ~$135bn pro forma; ~$19.7bn of credit lines available; ratings one or two notches above junk.◆ Thin
5. What would force a cutA downgrade towards junk, or a major customer failing to pay. Oracle has said the ratings come before the dividend.◆ Possible
6. The growth rate and its directionFlat since April 2025, after rises from $0.32 (2022) to $0.40 (2023) to $0.50 (2025).Stalled

Our reading. The dividend costs Oracle about $6bn a year against a capital programme of $90–95bn, so it is not what will decide the company's fate. But it is paid from borrowed and newly raised money, and Oracle has told us plainly that it would protect its rating first. Nobody should own Oracle for the income.

◆
Part
XI

★ Valuation — the two Oracles, recomputed

What the database is worth, what is left for the data centres, and where we would look again

FY2027 consensus EPS ◆
$8.15
14.1×, from 16.8× in September. Estimates unchanged.
FY2028 consensus EPS
$11.10
10.4×. Assumes the backlog converts on schedule.
Oracle's FY2030 target
≥$21
5.5× today's price. At 12× in 2030, discounted, about $186 a share.
Free cash flow
−$28.7bn TTM
A yield of about −8%, before removing the prepayments that flattered it.
The two Oracles, recomputed$ per share: the old Oracle after net debt (navy) and what the price leaves for the AI cloud (gold).Sept, as we published$66$137AI cloud priced at 1.32× what it cost to buildSept, corrected$65$137AI cloud priced at 1.70× what it cost to buildToday$63$115AI cloud priced at 1.26× what it cost to buildAt $90$63$90AI cloud priced at 0.65× what it cost to build★ We used $162bn of property; the right figure is $127.8bn (the rest was leased assets).Old Oracle: ~$285bn franchise less ~$88bn net borrowings, our September method, unchanged.Sources: Oracle 10-Q (balance sheet), our September X-Ray; our arithmetic.

The method, unchanged; the input, corrected. In September we valued the database and applications business at about $285bn (about $39bn of annual revenue at a 50% operating margin, taxed, at about 18 times), subtracted about $88bn of net borrowings, and treated whatever the share price left over as the price of the AI cloud. We then compared that with what the AI cloud had cost to build. The comparison used $162bn of property; the right figure is $127.8bn.

Done correctly: at $137.10 in September, the price left about $218bn for an AI cloud that had cost about $128bn, 1.7 times cost, not the 1.3 we published. Today, with 8% more shares, the old Oracle is worth about $63 a share after net debt, and $115.06 leaves about $161bn for the AI cloud, about 1.26 times cost. At $100 it would be about 0.9 times. The 0.6 times we described for $100 now arrives at about $88–92, depending on how much more the AI cloud costs by December.

CaseWhat has to happenValue per share
The database aloneThe AI cloud is worth no more than its debts and leases: a large customer fails to pay, chips age, money stays dear.~$63
Our levelThe database pays for about two-thirds of the price; the data centres come at about 0.65× their cost.~$90
Oracle's plan, deliveredFY2030 EPS of $21, valued at 12× and discounted 3.5 years at 10%, plus dividends.~$186

Why we still do not name a central value. For most companies the cases in a table like this are points on a continuum, and the middle is a fair estimate. For Oracle the outcome is closer to binary: if the large customers pay and the money stays available, the plan's $186 is reachable and today's price will look cheap; if they do not, the debts and the $288bn of leases decide what the shares are worth, and that is not much more than the database alone. We cannot tell you which, and we are suspicious of anyone who can. That is what "too hard" means.

The level. We said $100 because there, we believed, the data centres would come at about 60 cents on the dollar. Correctly computed, that discount is now at about $90: about 11 times the fiscal-2027 estimate, with the database business worth about 70% of the share price. At that point an investor would be paid for the leverage and the concentration rather than asked to ignore them. We move the level to $90, and we keep the conditions: look at the second-quarter free cash flow and at any rating action first.

The database alone ($63), our level ($90), the price ($115), Oracle's plan delivered ($186) — Still too hard
$63
$90
$115
$186
$40$200
★ Still too hard — the level moves to $90. At $115 the data centres are priced at about 1.26× what they cost; at $90, about 0.65×. Analysts' mean target: ~$231. → Interactive valuation on the company page
◆
Part
XII

Risks, lawsuits & controversies

Verified 18 November 2026 against the Q1 FY2027 10-Q, the 2026 proxy, the November prospectuses and attributed reports

OpenAI concentration (undisclosed)$288bn of leases not yet startedRatings: Moody's outlook negativeFunding cap used in five daysCustomers pulling back (reported)Chip obsolescence vs contract lifeFounder's pledged sharesSecurities class actionPower and permitting delays

Securities class action. Barrows v. Oracle (District of Delaware) alleges that Oracle misled investors about its AI build-out and its financing; the claims are unproven. Oracle moved to dismiss on 16 September; the motion will be fully briefed on 18 December. A separate suit by bondholders, led by an Ohio carpenters' pension plan in New York state court, alleges misleading statements in the offering documents for the September 2025 notes; we found no later developments. In the Netherlands, a privacy class action was sent back to a lower court by the Supreme Court on 17 July 2026.

Customer and project news in this report (Microsoft's wind-down, the Tencent lease, the New Mexico force-majeure notice, project-finance amounts) comes from press reports by Bloomberg, the Financial Times and Reuters, as cited; Oracle has not confirmed the Microsoft and Tencent reports in its filings.

★ How we will know — six dated tests
TestTodayWhat would change our mind
Q2 FY2027 results, ~10 DecRPO $664bn; FCF −$5.4bn (Q1)RPO up with a named customer under 40% of it, and free cash flow better than −$10bn without prepayments, would make the case less binary.
RatingsBaa2 neg. / BBB− / BBBA downgrade to junk by any agency would raise the cost of every future dollar and put the dividend in question.
Leases not yet started$288bnAnother large rise without matching new customer contracts would be the wrong direction.
Funding outside the capCap usedAny new share issue before fiscal 2030 would break the Investor Day promise outright.
Delaware class action, 18 DecMotion to dismiss pendingA dismissal removes a cost; survival of the claims means years of discovery about the AI financing.
The price$115.06Near $90 with the rating and the customers intact: look again seriously. Near $90 after a downgrade: wait.
◆ PART XIII · To our shareholders
The Letter ⓘ

In September I told you Oracle was too hard, and that around a hundred dollars I would look again, because there the old database business would pay for most of the price and the new data centres would come at about sixty cents on each dollar they had cost. The shares have not reached a hundred. But I have looked again anyway, and the first thing I must tell you is that my sixty cents was wrong. I took the cost of the data centres from a figure that included buildings Oracle rents, not ones it owns. Done properly, at a hundred dollars you would be paying about ninety cents on the dollar. The discount I described is nearer ninety dollars a share.

The second thing is the funding. At the end of October Oracle gave its owners the plan they had asked for: free cash flow by 2028, thirty billion dollars of it in 2029, earnings of twenty-one dollars a share by 2030, and a promise to raise no more than twenty billion dollars of new capital before then. On the following Monday it raised the whole twenty billion: half in new shares at a hundred and sixteen dollars, half in bonds paying up to eight and two-thirds per cent. Perhaps that was prudence, taking the money while it was there. But when a company has to tell you how little it will borrow, and then borrows all of it within a week at those rates, the lenders are telling you something, and so is the company.

Give the business its due. The database underneath it all is one of the finest franchises in software; nobody is leaving it, and it is now sold inside every major cloud. The new business is booking contracts faster than almost anyone, more than thirty billion dollars of them in a single quarter. If the customers pay, Oracle's own plan makes today's price look like a bargain, and I will have been too cautious twice.

But the signals since September have mostly run the other way. Leases signed for data centres not yet built rose by twenty-eight billion dollars in one quarter, to two hundred and eighty-eight billion. Part of last quarter's cash flow was customers lending Oracle money. One large customer is reported to be walking away from older capacity, and another contract was cancelled because Washington objected. The founder, who owns more than a third of the company, has a large part of it pledged against personal loans. None of that is fatal. All of it makes the outcome more binary, and I do not know how to put a fair price on a coin toss with debt attached.

So: still too hard. If the shares come to about ninety dollars, with the ratings intact and the customers still paying, the database would be worth about seventy per cent of what you pay and the data centres would come at about two-thirds of their cost. That is a price at which you are paid for the risk rather than asked to ignore it, and I would look again seriously. Until then, I would rather explain a missed opportunity than a leveraged loss.

— The Buffett Lens. When the arithmetic in a bull case depends on one number, check that number twice; we did not, and we have now.

▲The Bull Case
★★ The order book keeps growing — more than $30bn of new AI contracts in Q1; RPO $664bn; Q2 guided to revenue +30–34% and cloud +65–71%; FY2030 targets of ≥$225bn revenue and ≥$21 EPS, positive FCF in H2 FY28.
★ The toll road underneath — the database franchise, worth about $63 a share after net debt on our estimate, with switching costs intact and now sold inside every major cloud.
★ Cheaper on earnings — 14.1× FY27 and 10.4× FY28 consensus, unchanged estimates; 5.5× Oracle's own FY2030 target; one director bought $3.5m at $139.
▼The Bear Case
★★ The money is getting dear — the $20bn funding cap announced on 28 Oct was used on 2 Nov: $10bn of shares at $116 and $10bn of notes at 7.00–8.65%; shares +8% since May; Moody's outlook negative.
★ Commitments outside the debt line — $288bn of leases signed but not started (+$28bn in a quarter); $11.4bn of Q1 cash flow was financed prepayments; debt with leases $169bn, not the $156bn we published.
★ Customers and the founder — Microsoft reportedly winding down older capacity, a ~$7bn Tencent lease reportedly cancelled, OpenAI's share still undisclosed; 413m of the founder's shares pledged; dividend paid from financing.
Still Too Hard —
The Cap Lasted Five Days
A superb database franchise financing a leveraged AI build whose funding promise lasted a week. ★ At $115.06, 14.1× FY2027 consensus, the data centres are priced at about 1.26× what they cost, between the database alone (~$63) and Oracle's own plan delivered (~$186). Our September level of $100 rested on a wrong figure; corrected, the discount we wanted is at about $90. Q2 FY27 results ~10 December; watch free cash flow and the ratings.
⚡Where the database is about 70% of the price and the data centres come at about two-thirds of their cost. Add the $90 price trigger to your Watchlist.
◆ The Buffett Lens · Dividend Line Research · As of 18 Nov 2026 · Price $115.06 (17 Nov close) · Follow-up to our 27 Sep 2026 X-Ray
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Disclaimer: This is an editorial analysis for information and education, not investment advice, and not a recommendation to buy or sell any security. ⚠️ Price and market data are from our live data pull of 17 November 2026; the price used is the 17 November close. Results, guidance, the order book, leases, financing, ownership and legal matters are from Oracle's releases, Form 10-Q for the quarter to 31 August 2026, Form 10-K for fiscal 2026, 2026 proxy statement, 8-Ks and the prospectuses of 2–4 November 2026; Investor Day remarks from the company's release and a third-party transcript; customer and project news from Bloomberg, the Financial Times and Reuters as reported by third parties, and not confirmed by Oracle. Our valuation of the "two Oracles" is a rough estimate, labelled as such, and corrects an input we used in September. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Do your own research or consult a licensed adviser.
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