What we said in October — and what happened
The ledger held, the level was reached, the leak was in the wrong place, and six details were wrong
On 17 October we published Intuit at $325.15, 52% below its high of a year earlier. Our thesis was that half the fall was the AI sell-off of all software and half was a real leak at the low end of TurboTax; that QuickBooks, which earns most of the money, was not leaking; and that the price treated a compounder as a casualty. We told readers to begin buying and to add below $280, and to watch the first-quarter results in late November and the 2027 tax season. The shares rose 10% in the next three weeks, then fell. On 20 November, the day after the first-quarter results, they closed at $270.44, 16.8% below our price and 3.4% below our level. Here is the account.
| What we said on 17 Oct | What happened by 20 Nov | Grade |
|---|---|---|
| 'Begin accumulating; add below $280' | Up to $356.64 on 4 November, then the first close below $280 on 20 November. A buyer at $325 is 16.8% down. | ◆ Level reached |
| Q1 guided at +11%, 'the next test' | Revenue $4,354m, +12%, above the top of the guide; GAAP earnings per share $2.59 against $1.59. | ✓ Beaten |
| 'QuickBooks is not leaking' | QuickBooks Online Accounting +19%, online ecosystem +20%; slowing from +23% for the year, and the segment margin fell from 79% to 76%. | ✓ Holding, slower |
| FY2027 GAAP EPS +22–24% | Kept, as was operating income; the adjusted figure, now counting stock pay, was kept too. | ✓ Right |
| The AI risk lay in TurboTax and QuickBooks; Credit Karma 'tied to the lending cycle' | The first AI damage came in Credit Karma: its forecast for the year cut from +11–13% to +3–7%, which management blamed partly on 'a shift in consumer behavior toward AI-powered experiences'. | ✗ Wrong place |
| FY2027 revenue +9–10%; consumer +4–8% a year | Revenue guide cut to +8–9%; consumer to +2–4% this year (the three-year 4–8% kept, as reported). | ✗ Cut |
| Mailchimp: '$12bn… shrinking'; a possible write-down | Sold for $3.68bn, about 31% of cost. No write-down: after an earlier reallocation, Mailchimp carries only $641m of goodwill, and Intuit expects a gain on paper. | ◆ Right on value, wrong on the write-down |
| Company buying 'at around $300 — exactly the time to buy' | Bought 4.6m shares in the quarter at an average of $318.18, now 15% under water. | ✗ Early |
Our errors. Six details in the October report were wrong or out of date, and we correct them here. First, our growth chart showed a GAAP operating margin of 28.8% for fiscal 2026; the correct figure is 27.4% ($5,884m on $21,448m of revenue), as our own text said. The chart left out a $293m restructuring charge. Second, we wrote that Intuit had asked the court to dismiss the FTC's remaining case and that the FTC would not oppose. In fact the court dismissed the case on 15 September 2026, "which concluded this lawsuit", a month before we published. Third, we said Intuit's typical price-to-earnings ratio had been 35–55 times. At the fiscal year-ends of 2022 to 2025 it was 57–63 times; the fall to today's multiple is even larger than we said. Fourth, we dated the 15% dividend raise to 20 August; Intuit announced it on 25 August, with its results (20 August is the date in our feed). Fifth, we wrote that the chief executive owned about 53,000 shares outright. That was the figure in the 2025 proxy, before the sale of 41,000 shares in January; at 1 October the trust held about 32,300. Sixth, our list of lawsuits named two securities class actions but missed two shareholder derivative suits, filed on 18 and 28 September against current and former directors and officers.
Two judgements also deserve grading. We placed the AI risk in tax and bookkeeping, and it arrived first in the credit marketplace, which we treated as a cyclical business. And we praised the company's buybacks near $300; it kept buying, at higher prices, and today those purchases are under water. Every other figure we re-checked, including the segment numbers, the guidance and its accounting for stock pay, free cash flow and the one-off tax catch-up, the buyback history, the net debt in July, the dividend history, the insiders' sales and the director's purchase, was right.
★ Up 10% after our X-Ray, then down 24%
Three good weeks, an AI scare, and the worst reaction to results since May
| Date | What happened | INTU that day |
|---|---|---|
| 22 Oct | No company news found. | +5.8% |
| 4 Nov | The high since our X-Ray, 9.7% above our price. | $356.64 |
| 17 Nov | Software sold as a group (Salesforce −9.5%, ServiceNow −6.5%); press tied Intuit's fall to Anthropic's 'Personal Finance in Claude', a test product launched on 5 November that reads users' linked bank accounts (Startup Fortune). | −7.2% |
| 19 Nov | Q1 results and the Mailchimp sale after the close; the shares fell about 15% in late trading (CNBC). | −1.0% |
| 20 Nov | The reaction: revenue guide cut on Credit Karma, a profit guide below analysts' hopes, Mailchimp sold at a fraction of cost (as reported). Volume three to four times normal. | −12.8%, $270.44 |
Two falls, two causes. The fall of 17 November had nothing to do with Intuit's numbers. It was a day on which the market sold any company that an AI assistant might replace, and Intuit's chosen example was a test product from Anthropic that links to a user's bank accounts and answers questions about their money. The fall of 20 November was about Intuit's own numbers, and it was the larger of the two. Between them they took the shares from $345.56 to $270.44 in four trading days.
That order matters. In October we argued that the market was selling Intuit on fear of AI before any evidence of it. In November the evidence arrived, in one business, and the market sold the whole company on it. That is the same mistake made with better reasons. Part III separates the part of the evidence that is real from the part that is the market's mood.
Where the price sits. At $270.44 the shares are 6% above the 2026 closing low of $255.07 (25 June), 15% below the average price Intuit paid for its own shares in the quarter, 13% below the $309.50 the lead independent director paid in May, and 66% below the record of July 2025. The market value has fallen from about $87bn to about $71bn.
★★ The ledger grew; the credit marketplace slowed
QuickBooks at +19%, Credit Karma cut to 3–7%, and profit guidance kept
On 19 November Intuit reported revenue of $4,354m for the quarter to 31 October, up 12% and above the top of its own range. Its business unit, now called Global Business Solutions and reported without Mailchimp, grew 15% to $3,083m. Within it, QuickBooks Online Accounting grew 19% to $1,434m, on "higher effective prices, mix shift, and customer growth", and the online services around it (payroll, payments and loans to small businesses) grew 21%. GAAP operating income rose 63% to $868m, and GAAP earnings per share to $2.59 from $1.59. Stock-based pay fell to 11.4% of revenue from 14.0%.
| Q1 fiscal 2027 | Value | vs a year earlier |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $4,354m | +12% (guide +11%) |
| QuickBooks Online Accounting / online ecosystem | $1,434m / $2,433m | +19% / +20% |
| Credit Karma | $708m | +9% (fiscal 2026: +20%) |
| Mailchimp | $313m; segment margin 65% | −1%; margin 44% a year earlier |
| GAAP operating income / margin | $868m / 19.9% | $534m / 13.7% |
| Earnings per share: GAAP / adjusted (incl. stock pay) | $2.59 / $2.91 | $1.59 / $1.87 |
| Free cash flow (Derived) | $987m | $599m |
| Q2 guide: revenue / GAAP EPS | +6–7% / $2.55–2.60 | Consumer to fall mid-single digits (as reported) |
Credit Karma. The bad news was in one line. Credit Karma, the free credit-score app that earns fees when its users take a card, a loan or an insurance policy it recommends, grew 9% against 20% last year, and Intuit cut its forecast for the year from 11–13% growth to 3–7%. The whole of the $172m cut to the company's revenue forecast came from Credit Karma. The 10-Q gives two reasons, "higher interest rates and a shift in consumer behavior". On the call the finance chief said Credit Karma was "below our internal expectations for both revenue and engagement", and the chief executive described "a faster-than-anticipated impact from a shift in consumer behavior toward AI-powered experiences" (as reported): people who once opened Credit Karma to compare cards and loans are starting to ask an AI assistant instead.
This is the first place where AI has visibly cost Intuit revenue, and we did not expect it to come here first. In October we treated Credit Karma as a business tied to the lending cycle. Part of it is: credit-card revenue fell $16m in the quarter as rates stayed high. But the engagement problem is the AI problem in its purest form. Credit Karma's value rests on being where people go to look; if they go somewhere else to look, it loses its toll even if nothing else changes.
Why the rest held. Profit guidance for the year was kept: GAAP operating income of $7.41–7.49bn and GAAP earnings per share of $20.12–20.36, up 22–24%. Management offset the lost Credit Karma revenue with lower costs, including stock pay (as reported). QuickBooks, the business that matters most, grew 19%. That is slower than the 23% of last year, and the segment margin fell three points as Intuit spent more on payments, loans and marketing; but it is still a high-teens growth rate on a business with a 76% segment margin. If AI is coming for the ledger, it has not arrived yet.
★ Mailchimp, sold for 31 cents on the dollar
The end of the largest mistake, and what it does to the numbers
On 19 November Intuit agreed to sell Mailchimp, the email-marketing business it bought in 2021 for about $12bn, to Bending Spoons, an Italian owner of software businesses, for $3.68bn. Intuit will reinvest about $368m of the price in 8.8m new Bending Spoons shares, so the net cash is about $3.31bn. The sale needs competition approvals; Intuit expects it to close early in 2027, with a final deadline of 19 August 2027. The finance chief said Intuit would use all the cash for buybacks (as reported). The chief executive called the sale "better for our focus, better for our capital allocation" (as reported).
The verdict on the purchase. In October we called Mailchimp a twelve-billion-dollar mistake that was shrinking. The sale confirms it: Intuit will recover about 31% of what it paid, an economic loss of about $8bn, roughly an eighth of today's market value. It will not show as a loss in the accounts. When Intuit reorganised its segments in August it moved most of the goodwill from the purchase into the business unit, leaving Mailchimp with only $641m on the books, so the sale is expected to produce a gain. That is accounting, not value. The value was lost in 2021, when Intuit paid a boom-time price, partly in its own shares at $626.
Was it a good sale? We think so, on balance. Mailchimp's revenue was shrinking (−1.2% in fiscal 2026, −1% in the quarter), and Intuit had just cut its costs hard: the segment margin rose from 44% to 65% in a year, largely by spending less on staff and marketing. Bending Spoons pays about 2.9 times Mailchimp's revenue and about 4.6 times its current annualised segment profit. That segment profit does not carry its share of stock pay or corporate costs, so the true multiple is higher. A buyer that specialises in running mature software for cash is a natural owner; a growth company that needs its managers' attention elsewhere is not.
| Mailchimp | Figure | Read |
|---|---|---|
| Bought (2021) | ~$12bn (cash plus shares at $626) | Boom-time price |
| Sold (agreed 19 Nov 2026) | $3.68bn; ~$3.31bn net cash | ◆ ~31% of cost |
| Revenue, fiscal 2026 | $1,272m (−1.2%) | Shrinking |
| Segment profit, Q1 (annualised) | $202m (~$808m) | Before stock pay and corporate costs |
| Goodwill left on the books | $641m | A gain on paper, a loss in fact |
| Effect on earnings per share (Derived) | ≈ −3% to −6% | Lost profit, less ~4.6% fewer shares from buybacks |
What it does to the numbers. Intuit's guidance does not yet include the sale. Our rough arithmetic: $3.31bn would buy about 12m shares at today's price, 4.6% of the total; Mailchimp's segment profit after tax is about 7.5–10% of the company's adjusted net income. Net of the buybacks, earnings per share would be about 3–6% lower than without the sale, before any savings in corporate costs, which management has not quantified. We have lowered our central value by about 4% for it (Part XI). Intuit becomes a simpler company of two parts: the ledger, and the consumer business of tax and credit.
AI, the new front door
Inside the assistants, and losing visits to them
Intuit's answer to AI is to be inside every assistant. On the call the chief executive said AI tools and agents "are becoming new front doors for discovery" (as reported), and described how Intuit is walking through them: QuickBooks works inside Claude, ChatGPT and Perplexity; TurboTax and Credit Karma inside Claude and ChatGPT; more than 30% of QuickBooks customers who connected an assistant use it weekly; and invoices sent through the QuickBooks connector are running at more than $1bn a year. The company also says that when AI assistants are asked about tax software, they name TurboTax first about four times as often as the next brand.
This is the right strategy and it has a cost. A customer who reaches QuickBooks through Claude still pays for QuickBooks, because the ledger, the payroll records and the tax history live there. A customer who asks Claude which credit card to get may never see Credit Karma at all. The first kind of business is a destination; the second is a toll on a road that is moving. Credit Karma's cut tells us which of Intuit's businesses are which, and it is consistent with what we said about the ledger in October: a system of record is harder to go around than a comparison page.
| Business | What AI does to it | Evidence so far | Read |
|---|---|---|---|
| QuickBooks (ledger, payroll, payments) | Assistants act on the books; the books stay in QuickBooks. | +19%; mid-market +30% in customers (as reported). | ✓ Destination |
| TurboTax | Assistants could fill in simple returns; Intuit cuts prices at the low end first. | Units −2% last season; Q2 revenue to fall; the 2027 season is the test. | ◆ Leaking at the low end |
| Credit Karma | Assistants answer 'which card?' without a visit. | +9%; year cut to 3–7%; engagement 'below expectations'. | ✗ Toll on a moving road |
The 2027 tax season. Intuit is cutting prices on purpose at the bottom of the market: free federal returns with a $15 flat fee for state returns through Credit Karma Tax, and a lower average revenue per tax customer this year, with the stated aim to "grow our share of total IRS e-filers" (as reported). It gave no target for the number of returns. Revenue from TurboTax is guided up only 2–3% for the year and down in the second quarter. The season runs from February to April; the first reliable numbers come in May. In October we said the market might be right about the low end of tax. Intuit's own pricing says it agrees.
The moat, rechecked
The ledger is still a fortress; the comparison page was a fence, and AI is climbing it
| The claim (October) | Evidence now | Verdict |
|---|---|---|
| QuickBooks: switching costs of a system of record | Online Accounting +19% on higher prices and more customers; mid-market product revenue (QuickBooks Advanced and Intuit Enterprise Suite) +41% (as reported). | ✓ Intact |
| Pricing power in the ledger | 'Higher effective prices' cited again in the 10-Q. | ✓ Intact |
| TurboTax: brand at the top, leaking at the bottom | Deliberate price cuts at the low end for the 2027 season. | ◆ As expected |
| Credit Karma: a network of members and lenders | Engagement below plan; growth cut to 3–7%; AI assistants named as a cause. | ✗ Narrowing |
We keep the moat at 7, but its shape has changed. In October the score blended a wide moat in the ledger with a narrowing one in tax. Now it blends a wide moat in the ledger, a narrowing one in tax and a third business, Credit Karma, whose advantage depended on being the first place people looked, and which is losing that place faster than we expected. The ledger is about half of revenue and most of the profit, which is why the score does not fall further. The retention rate of QuickBooks customers, 83% overall and "in the 90s" excluding businesses that closed (as reported), is the number to watch for the ledger, as the renewal rate was for ServiceNow.
- That owner earnings grow by about 2% a year or more for ten years; GAAP earnings per share are guided up 22–24% this year.
- That QuickBooks keeps growing in the mid-teens even as AI assistants become the way small businesses talk to their books.
- That Credit Karma stabilises rather than shrinks, and that TurboTax's price cuts keep customers without destroying its margins.
The competition
Cheap tax software, assisted preparers and the assistants themselves
| Rival | Where it meets Intuit | The latest | Read |
|---|---|---|---|
| AI assistants (Claude, ChatGPT and others) | Answer money, tax and credit questions; also Intuit's partners. | Anthropic launched a bank-linked personal-finance test on 5 November (as reported). | ◆ Partner and rival |
| Low-cost tax software | Simple returns at the bottom of the market. | The reason Intuit is cutting its own low-end prices. | ◆ Taking units |
| Assisted preparers | The 88% of the tax market that pays someone to file (Intuit's estimate, as reported). | About 14m assisted filers switch each year, a third on price (as reported); Intuit's TurboTax Live targets them. | ✓ Intuit's opportunity |
| IRS Direct File / Free File | A free government alternative. | Direct File suspended; the 10-Q says 'proponents… continue to advocate'. No new IRS move found. | ◆ Dormant |
The competitor that matters most is also the partner. Intuit pays the AI laboratories and works with them; its products sit inside their assistants. The same assistants are the reason Credit Karma's visitors are thinning. This is not a new kind of problem. Every business that relied on being found, from newspapers' classified pages to comparison sites, has faced the moment when someone else became the place people looked first. The ones that survived owned something the new front door needed: the data, the transaction or the record. QuickBooks owns the record. Credit Karma owns the relationship with lenders but not the moment of choice. TurboTax owns the return once it is filed, and is fighting to keep the moment of choice.
Management, insiders & capital allocation
A sensible sale, buybacks paid partly from the balance sheet, and new plans to sell
The sale plans. On 16 March Intuit announced that its founder and all its executive leadership had cancelled their plans to sell shares, a signal of confidence with the shares near $450. The 10-Q filed on 19 November discloses that three of those executives adopted new plans on 11 and 16 September, with the shares between about $318 and $322. Selling under a plan set in advance is legal and common; executives are paid largely in shares and have taxes and lives to finance. But the March announcement was meant to tell owners something, and the September plans tell them something too. We record it without drama, and we lower the management score from 6 to 5 for it and for what follows.
Capital allocation. In the quarter Intuit returned $1.85bn: $1.47bn of buybacks, 4.6m shares at an average of $318.18, and $378m of dividends. Free cash flow was $987m. The difference came from the balance sheet, which also repaid $750m of notes and paid the year's bonuses, so cash and investments fell to $5.32bn and net debt rose from $0.47bn in July to $1.60bn. Intuit also expects to pay about $2bn of income tax in fiscal 2027, mostly in the second half, against very little in fiscal 2026, when a change in the tax treatment of research costs gave it a one-off refund. None of this is dangerous; net debt is about two months of free cash flow. But it means the buybacks of the last two quarters were partly paid for with last year's tax windfall, at prices well above today's.
Insiders. Since 17 October no director or executive has bought or sold a share on the market; the Forms 4 show only routine awards. The last open-market purchase was by the lead independent director, Vasant Prabhu, at about $309.50 in May.
The numbers
Cheaper than at any time in years, a tax bill coming, and six faults in our feed
Twelve months to October. Revenue was $21.9bn, GAAP earnings per share $17.46 and adjusted earnings per share, now counting stock pay, $19.67. Free cash flow was about $9.0bn, or $33.60 a share, but about $1.28bn of it was the one-off tax refund. Without it, and after subtracting $2.0bn of stock-based pay, owner earnings were about $5.7bn, or $21.30 a share. That is the number we value.
Earnings quality. The first quarter's GAAP earnings include $119m of gains on long-term investments, about $0.33 a share after tax, which will not recur. Stock pay fell to 11.4% of revenue from 14.0%, after last year's 17% staff cut. Adjusted earnings now treat stock pay as a cost, as we asked companies to do in October; the restated figure for fiscal 2026 is $18.63, so the guided $22.88–23.12 for fiscal 2027 is growth of 23–24%.
The balance sheet. At 31 October Intuit had $5.32bn of cash and investments against $6.92bn of debt, including $970m of non-recourse facilities that fund its small-business loans: net debt of $1.60bn. It originated or bought $1.8bn of loans in the quarter, 39% more than a year earlier, and its provision for credit losses rose to $64m from $40m. The lending book is small against the company, but it is growing fast and deserves a line in every quarterly check.
| What the screen shows | What is wrong, and the number to use |
|---|---|
| Revenue by segment, fiscal 2026: $33.3bn | Old and new segment rows added together, and no Mailchimp row. Revenue was <b>$21.45bn</b>: business $11.59bn, consumer $8.58bn, Mailchimp $1.27bn. Flagged in October; still unfixed. |
| Net debt $3.67bn | Adds $789m of leases and ignores $1.28bn of investments. Net debt is <b>$1.60bn</b>. |
| Free cash flow $9.05bn; P/FCF 8×; yield 12.5% | Includes the $1.28bn one-off tax refund and understates capital spending. Use ~$7.7bn before stock pay; fiscal 2027 brings ~$2bn of cash tax. |
| Estimates: fiscal 2026 'estimate' $23.8; fiscal 2027 $22.98 — a fall | Fiscal 2026 is over and was on the old basis. On the same basis earnings are guided <b>+23–24%</b>. Flagged in October; still unfixed. |
| Analysts: 27 buy, 13 hold, 5 sell | Unchanged since 17 October and inconsistent with the feed's own monthly history (34 analysts on 1 November). Treat as stale. |
| Dividends: last entry October; declared 20 August | The $1.38 declared on 19 November (paid 15 January) is missing, and declaration dates differ from the public announcements (25 August, not 20 August — the source of our own fourth error). |
★ The dividend
Fifteen straight raises, a sixth of free cash flow, now a 2% yield — tested
On 19 November the board declared a quarterly dividend of $1.38, payable on 15 January 2027 to holders of record on 8 January, the same as the last quarter's after August's 15% raise. At four times $1.38 the yield is 2.0% at today's price, against 1.7% in October and under 1% at every fiscal year-end from 2022 to 2025. Intuit has raised its dividend every year since it began paying in 2011, by about 15% a year for the last six years.
| Test | Intuit | Result |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Covered by earnings | 27% of fiscal-2027 GAAP earnings guidance | ✓ Pass |
| 2. Covered by free cash flow | 15% of trailing free cash flow; 18% without the one-off tax refund | ✓ Pass |
| 3. Growing | $1.20 (FY2016) → $4.80 (FY2026), 14.9% a year; latest raise +15.0% | ✓ Pass |
| 4. Never cut | Fifteen consecutive annual raises since the first dividend in 2011 | ✓ Pass |
| 5. Balance sheet behind it | Net debt $1.6bn, about two months of free cash flow | ✓ Pass |
| 6. A stated policy | 'We currently expect to continue to pay comparable cash dividends on a quarterly basis' (10-Q) | ✓ Pass |
The point to watch is the same as in October: not the dividend, which takes a sixth of the cash, but the buybacks beside it. In the first quarter the two together took almost twice the quarter's free cash flow, and the second half of the year brings a $2bn tax bill. We expect the dividend to rise again next August by something close to its usual rate; the buyback pace, outside the Mailchimp proceeds, is the part that should slow.
★ Valuation
A business guiding to 22% earnings growth, priced for 2%
Our method. As in October, we value Intuit on owner earnings, free cash flow less stock-based pay, over ten years at 10% a year, with a multiple on the tenth year. We start from about $21 a share and trim our October cases for what we learned: revenue growth of 8–9% this year instead of 9–10%, Credit Karma reset lower, and Mailchimp sold. Re-running the October assumptions reproduces our October values exactly (~$227, ~$444 and ~$681), so the changes below are changes of view, not of arithmetic.
| Path | Owner earnings start | Growth, years 1–5 / 6–10 | Exit multiple | Value today |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax and credit erode, no growth | $19 | 0% / 0% | 10× | ~$190 |
| Central case, after Mailchimp ◆ | $21, less ~4% | 8% / 5% | 15× | ~$395 |
| The ledger compounds | $23 | 12% / 7% | 18× | ~$632 |
| What $270.44 implies | $21 | ~2% a year, constant | 13× | $270.44 |
What is priced in? At $270.44 the shares assume owner earnings grow by about 2% a year for ten years and are then valued at 13 times; at an exit of 16 times the implied growth is under 1%. Put simply, the price assumes Intuit has stopped growing. Its own guidance is for GAAP earnings to rise 22–24% this year; analysts expect about 13% next year; and its business unit is still growing in the mid-teens. In October, at $325, the same arithmetic implied about 4.6%. The market has moved from "slow growth" to "no growth".
Why not buy it all now? Because the central case is more fragile than it was. If growth in the first five years is 6% rather than 8%, the value falls to about $378; if the exit multiple is 13 rather than 15, to about $380; if owner earnings start at $19.50 rather than $21, to about $381. All are well above today's price. But Credit Karma showed that the AI threat can arrive in a part of the business we thought was safe from it, and the 2027 tax season is still ahead. A discount that covers our being wrong about one more business is worth waiting for with part of the money.
Our level. For a business with one wide moat and two uncertain ones, we want about 40% off our central value. That gives about $235: about 11.6 times this year's GAAP earnings guidance, close to the price at which the no-growth case still earns 10% a year, and 8% below the 2026 low. Our October level of $280 has been reached, and we keep its advice: add now. Complete the position below $235.
Risks, lawsuits & controversies
Verified 22 November 2026 against the Q1 fiscal 2027 10-Q, 8-Ks and attributed reports
Legal. Two securities class actions filed in July and August 2026 have no lead plaintiff yet; two shareholder derivative suits filed on 18 and 28 September accuse current and former directors and officers of breaches of duty, which Intuit disputes. A class action in Ontario was certified in July and is under appeal. The FTC's case over "free" advertising ended on 15 September, when the court dismissed it as moot.
Credit. Intuit lends to small businesses and buys consumer loans: originations and purchases were $1.8bn in the quarter, up 39%, and the credit-loss provision rose 60% to $64m. Small against the company, growing fast.
| Test | Today | What would change our mind |
|---|---|---|
| Q2 results, late February | Revenue guide +6–7% | Another cut to Credit Karma, or to the profit guidance, would say the leak is spreading; we would stop at the first stage. |
| QuickBooks Online Accounting growth | +19% | Mid-teens or better keeps the ledger thesis; below 15% would put it in question. |
| The 2027 tax season (results in May) | TurboTax +2–3% guided | Units and share of IRS e-filers up on lower prices would vindicate the price cuts; units down again would not. |
| Credit Karma | +9%; year 3–7% | Stabilising engagement would make it cyclical after all; shrinking revenue would make it the first AI casualty. |
| Executive sales from December | Plans for ~183,000 shares | Sales are expected; sales well beyond the plans, or new ones, would tell us more. |
| The price | $270.44 | Below $235 with the tests intact: complete the position. |
In October I wrote that the market had priced Intuit as a casualty of a technology it was trying hard to own, that the tax business had a real leak and the ledger did not, and that I would begin buying at three hundred and twenty-five dollars and add below two hundred and eighty. Five weeks later the shares are at two hundred and seventy. A reader who followed me is about a sixth behind, and I owe that reader an account.
The ledger did what I expected. QuickBooks grew nineteen per cent, the company beat its own forecast, and it kept its promise of earnings growth above twenty per cent this year. The leak appeared, but not where I was looking. Credit Karma, which I treated as a business that rises and falls with lending, turned out to be the first part of Intuit that AI has visibly hurt. People who used to open it to choose a credit card are starting to ask a chatbot instead. A business that earns its living by being the place people look is in trouble when they start looking somewhere else.
The company also sold Mailchimp, for about a third of what it paid. I called that purchase a mistake in October; the sale makes it official and ends it, which is the right thing to do with a mistake. And three senior executives, who had cancelled their plans to sell shares in March with some ceremony, quietly made new ones in September. I do not think anyone did anything wrong. I do think owners should notice.
I also got six details wrong in October, and I have corrected them here. None changes the verdict, but you should be able to trust the numbers you read in these pages.
So what is the business worth? Less than I thought in October, by about a tenth, because one of its three legs is weaker and one has been sold. The price has fallen by more than that. At two hundred and seventy dollars you pay about thirteen times this year's expected earnings for a company that expects those earnings to grow by more than a fifth, and the price only makes sense if Intuit hardly grows at all for a decade. I think that is too gloomy for a business whose ledger is still compounding. I would add now, as I promised at two hundred and eighty, and complete the position below two hundred and thirty-five, where even the gloomy case would leave a fair return. The tax season and Credit Karma's next quarters will tell us which of us is right.
— The Buffett Lens. When AI arrives in a business, ask whether customers come for the record or for the directions; the record is much harder to replace.
Complete Below $235A fine business, one of whose three legs AI has visibly hurt, priced as if none of it will grow. ★ At $270.44 the price is below our October level ($280) and our central value of ~$395, within a range of ~$190 (tax and credit erode) to ~$632 (the ledger compounds). Add now; complete the position below $235, about 40% below our central value. Q2 results in late February; the tax season from February to April.