X-Ray Analyses›Technology›Adobe
X-RayNº 11722 November 2026
◆ Follow-upThird X-Ray of Adobe. Our previous, dated 16 Sep 2026 at $250.50, concluded “Accumulate — the Melt Didn't Come, the Bill Did”. This report checks that call against what has happened since. Read it →
X-Ray Analysis◆The Buffett Lens
A

Adobe

NASDAQ: ADBE·Software — Application·United States·Explore ADBE live ↗

Priced below a decade of no growth, seventeen days before its hardest test

◆ The Buffett LensIn September we told readers to begin buying Adobe at half the usual size and to add toward $200, and to judge the company by its order book when it reports on 9 December. Since then there has been no new quarter, the shares have fallen 13.1%, almost exactly as much as the software basket, and Adobe still has no permanent finance chief and no head of its creative business. The outgoing chief executive sold $31m of shares the day we published. We also got six details wrong, the largest being the gross margin: its fall was half what we printed. Adobe's own targets imply that the order-book test will fail again in December. But at $217.71 the price is below what the business is worth if it never grows again. Buy the half now. Keep the rest for below $200.
◆ Educational analysis & opinion — not investment advice. Figures as of 22 November 2026. See full disclaimer below.
6
Moat
4
Management & Capital
9
Financial Strength
5
Growth
9
Valuation
6.6
◆ The Scorecard · one-second read
"The order book will probably fail its test again on 9 December. The price already assumes Adobe never grows again."
−13.1% since September, in step with software · no new quarter · gross margin 88.7%, not 88.1% · Adobe's targets imply net new ARR −15% in Q4 · free cash flow $10.6bn · 8.0× free cash flow · no permanent finance chief and no creative head
◆ Type · Cash machine priced for no growthDividend · None ever · 7% of shares retired in a year★ Follow-up · half now; the rest below $200
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◆
Part
I

What we said in September — and what happened

The price fell with software, the big tests wait for 9 December, and six details were wrong

On 16 September we published our second X-ray of Adobe at $250.50, nine cents above the price of our first in July. Our view was that Adobe's numbers had moved in cost rather than in demand: revenue was growing faster, but the gross margin had slipped and the contracted order book had grown only 8%. We said to keep accumulating, to add toward $200, and to hold the position at half the size we would have chosen in July, because the payoff depended on 2027 and the chief executive who chose the strategy was leaving. We said the number to watch was the order book in December.

That December report has not yet come. Adobe's fiscal year ends on 27 November and it reports on Wednesday 9 December, eight days into its new chief executive's tenure. So this is an unusual follow-up: no new quarter, a 13.1% fall, and a filing, the third-quarter 10-Q published six days after our report, against which we can check our own numbers. Here is the account.

What we said on 16 SepWhat happened by 20 NovGrade
'Accumulate; add toward ~$200; half size'Down 13.1% to $217.71, against 12.7% for the software basket (IGV). The low was $216.95; $200 was never reached.◆ Open, unrewarded
'The order book failed' (RPO +8%)Confirmed in the 10-Q: $22.16bn, up 8%, and lower than in May.✓ Right
Net new ARR ~$0.40bn, down ~36% (an analyst's figure, unchallenged)Our own constant-currency arithmetic from the 10-Q gives −39%.✓ Right
'Watch RPO in December… management promised it steps up'Not yet reported. The finance chief described a seasonal pattern ('this year is no different to prior years'), not a promise.◆ Open; we overstated it
Gross margin 88.1%, out of an 88.9–89.3% band88.7%, down 0.6 points, out of a band of 89.0–89.8%. Still the lowest since early 2024.✗ Wrong number, right direction
'An 11% cash yield; 9.1× free cash flow'Trailing free cash flow was $10.59bn, not $10.94bn: 10.8% and 9.25× at the time.✗ Overstated
'Figma pays the same bill with far less cash'Figma's third quarter: revenue +43%, far above its own forecast, and an adjusted operating margin of +12%.◆ A stronger rival than we said
A new chief executive on 1 Dec; the creative head leaving; an interim finance chiefAll true, and none of the gaps filled: no permanent finance chief and no head of the creative business named.✓ Right, unresolved
Topaz Labs: '$700m–$1bn is speculation'The 10-Q gives the price: about $340m, mostly cash.✓ Right to doubt

Our errors. Re-checking the September report against the 10-Q and Adobe's releases, we found six details that were wrong. First, the gross margin. We wrote that it fell to 88.1% from a band of 88.9–89.3%. The correct figure is 88.7% ($5,997m of gross profit on $6,760m of revenue), down 0.6 points from a year earlier, and the eight quarters before it ran from 89.0% to 89.8%. Our number came from our own data feed, which moved $40m of amortisation into the cost of sales for that one quarter (fault one in Part IX). The direction was right; the size was double. Second, free cash flow over twelve months was $10.59bn, not $10.94bn: we added the wrong quarter. The data services we dismissed in a footnote had it right. At $250.50 that was 9.25 times free cash flow and a 10.8% yield, not 9.1 times and 11%. Third, the market value was $97.9bn, not $99.6bn, and it was not the first time below $100bn since 2018: it was about $77bn at the June low. Fourth, we said total ARR growth for the first quarter was not disclosed. The first-quarter 10-Q discloses it: 10.9%. Fifth, the trailing price-to-earnings ratio was 14.0, not 13.6, as another part of the same report said. Sixth, we presented Shantanu Narayen's remark that the payoff "will play out, I think, over 2027" as part of the September story. It was said on the June call; the September call does not mention 2027. We also quoted the phrase "deferred, but not closed" about price rises. It is not in Adobe's corrected transcript, and we withdraw it.

One thing the corrections do to the argument deserves saying plainly. The first and second both made Adobe look slightly worse than it was, the first in the business and the second in the price. The margin dent is real but half the size, and the cash yield was a little lower than we said. Everything else we re-checked was right: revenue, subscription revenue, operating income and margins, earnings per share, the share count, the order book, the recurring-revenue series, AI-first ARR, the guidance, net debt, the buyback authorisation and the facts of the succession.

Our September price → today
$250.50 → $217.71
−13.1%; software basket −12.7%
Owner earnings a share
$21.89
free cash flow less stock pay, 12 months
Our level
$200, kept
8.9% below today's price
◆
Part
II

★ Down 13%, in step with software

Ahead of the basket for two months, then four bad days

Down 13.1% — and the software basket down 12.7%ADBE daily close, $, 1 Jul – 20 Nov 2026; grey: IGV rebased to ADBE on 16 Sep.200225250275300September X-Ray $250.50our level, $20012345678JulAugSepOctNov131 Jul · our first X-Ray, $250.4124 Sep · new CEO named: −6.7%316 Sep · our second X-Ray, $250.50422 Sep · no news found: −4.5%522 Oct · high since, $270.5564 Nov · Citi to Sell; shares +1%718 Nov · −4.0% while IGV rose820 Nov · $217.71, lowest since July★ Until 16 Nov Adobe was beating the basket; it gave the lead back in four days.Sources: our price history (ADBE, IGV); Adobe 8-Ks; press reports for the analyst moves.
DateWhat happenedADBE that day
22 SepNo company news found; the 10-Q was filed after the close. The software basket fell 0.4%.−4.5%
12 OctWells Fargo cut Adobe to Underweight with a $225 target (as reported).−1.7%
15 OctAdobe and NVIDIA announced a wider partnership (as reported).+4.6%
22 OctNo cause found. The high since our X-Ray, 8.0% above our price.+6.1%, $270.55
4 NovCiti cut Adobe to Sell with a $207 target, warning of 'a hard reset' (as reported). The shares rose.+1.0%
10–12 NovAdobe MAX, the annual product conference: many AI launches, no financial targets.−0.3%, +0.4%, +0.4%
17 NovSoftware sold as a group ahead of Anthropic's stock-market listing (MarketWatch, as reported).−4.3%
18 NovAdobe fell while the basket rose 1.3%. No company news found.−4.0%
20 NovThe basket fell 4.6%; Adobe 1.8%. Lowest close since July.−1.8%, $217.71

No news, one direction. Since 16 September Adobe has published no results, no forecast and no 8-K. Its most important announcements were products at its MAX conference in Miami Beach, and the shares barely moved on them. The fall came in two stages. Through 16 November Adobe was down 1.8% while the software basket was down 5.7%. In the four trading days from 17 to 20 November it fell 11.5%, against 7.4% for the basket, and the two ended within half a point of each other. The market did not learn anything new about Adobe in those four days. It sold the group, and on 18 November it sold Adobe on its own.

The analysts moved first. Three firms downgraded the shares after our report: Wells Fargo to Underweight on 12 October, HSBC to Hold on 13 October, and Citi to Sell on 4 November. Citi's argument, as reported, is the clearest statement of the bear case now. Adobe chose to put its AI product, Firefly, ahead of price rises; Citi estimates that this costs about 2.5 points of recurring-revenue growth in fiscal 2027, cut its forecast for the gross margin for "unmonetized AI inference costs", and expects recurring revenue to grow only about 5% next year. The average analyst target is about $267 and the consensus rating is Hold (stockanalysis.com).

Where the price sits. At $217.71 the shares are 13% below our price, 13% below the $250.76 Adobe's outgoing chief executive received for $31m of shares in September, 7% below the average price Adobe paid for its own shares in the third quarter, and 12% above the $194.51 a director, David Ricks, paid for 10,000 shares in June. The market value is about $84.7bn, 68% below the peak of November 2021.

◆
Part
III

★★ The test on 9 December

What the order book and new recurring revenue must show, and what Adobe's own targets imply

The test on 9 December, in two picturesContracted order book (RPO) at each quarter-end, $ billions.$20.44bnQ3 FY25$22.52bnQ4 FY25$22.22bnQ1 FY26$22.27bnQ2 FY26$22.16bnQ3 FY26$24.24need $24.77Q4 FY26Q4 FY26: pale bar = last year's step-up repeated (+$2.08bn, +7.6%); green line = the +$2.61bn needed for +10%.Axis starts at $16bn.New recurring revenue added in the quarterNet new ARR, $ billions, constant currency; pale = fiscal 2025, dark = fiscal 2026.Q2 (FY26 ex-Semrush)$0.58bn$0.56bn −3%Q3$0.66bn$0.40bn −39%Q4 (FY26 implied by 10.2% target)$0.92bn$0.78bn −15%★ Hitting its own targets exactly would leave both tests failed for a second quarter.Sources: Adobe 10-Qs and releases, Q3 FY25 – Q3 FY26; Q3 FY26 call; our arithmetic.

In September we said that revenue had been the wrong number to watch, because at a subscription company it describes contracts signed long ago. The two numbers that look forward are the order book, which Adobe calls remaining performance obligations (RPO), and net new annual recurring revenue, the recurring revenue added in a quarter. We said Adobe would pass if the order book returned to double-digit growth and net new ARR stopped shrinking compared with a year earlier. Both answers come on 9 December. We can already say a good deal about them.

The order book. At the end of August it stood at $22.16bn, 8% higher than a year earlier and slightly lower than in May. The order book always jumps in Adobe's fourth quarter, because that is when large customers renew. Last year it rose by $2.08bn, to $22.52bn. To show growth of 10% this time it must reach $24.77bn, a jump of $2.61bn, a quarter more than last year's. If Adobe repeats last year's jump exactly, growth will be 7.6%. When we wrote that management had promised a step-up, we overstated what was said. Steve Day, the interim finance chief, said the book would "step up in our fourth quarter and then remain fairly flat over the next three quarters, and this year is no different to prior years in that shape." That is a description of the calendar, not a forecast of growth.

New recurring revenue. Adobe still aims for total ARR growth of 10.2% this year, the target it set at the start of the year. The year began with $25.66bn of recurring revenue at this year's exchange rates. Reaching 10.2% means ending at about $28.28bn, and the company stood at $27.50bn in August. So the target implies about $0.78bn of net new ARR in the fourth quarter, against about $0.92bn a year earlier: a fall of about 15%. Adobe's own target therefore implies that net new ARR shrinks for another quarter. If Adobe hits its targets exactly, both of our tests fail.

The testLast year's fourth quarterWhat Adobe's targets implyTo pass
Order book (RPO), growth+$2.08bn in the quarter~+7.6% if repeated≥ $24.77bn (+10%)
Net new ARR, constant currency~$0.92bn~$0.78bn (−15%)> $0.92bn
Total ARR growth, fiscal 2026—10.2% (target kept since December 2025)Above 10.2%
Fourth-quarter revenue / adjusted EPS—$6.80–6.85bn / $6.30–6.35Usually beaten
Fiscal-2027 targetsFirst given in DecemberConsensus: revenue +9.1%, EPS +12% (stockanalysis)The real test

Why we still think the test is right. A buyer of Adobe at nine times earnings is not paying for the last quarter's revenue. The buyer is paying for whether people still sign multi-year contracts for Creative Cloud and Acrobat in a world of free AI tools. The order book and new ARR are the closest public measures of that. If they fail again, the bear case gains a second data point. That would not prove the moat is gone. In September revenue still grew 12.9% and subscription revenue 13.7%. It would show that the company is renewing its customers on less generous terms than before.

Why December may say less than it seems. Three things will blur the reading. First, the new chief executive, Anil Chakravarthy, will set the fiscal-2027 targets eight days after taking office, and new chief executives usually set targets they can beat. Second, Adobe chose in June to put off price changes in Creative Cloud; Narayen said that about half of the resulting effect on this year's ARR came from that decision and half from the free offer. A price rise in 2027 would flatter the numbers; its absence would depress them. Third, the order book now includes Semrush, which Adobe bought in April. We will judge December on two questions: how much the order book and new ARR fell short, and whether the fiscal-2027 targets show the gap closing or widening. A miss is not by itself a reason to sell. A cut to the long-run outlook would be.

◆
Part
IV

The margin dent, measured again

Half the size we printed, and still real

Our September letter began with a confession that "something in the accounts moved", and the number we led with was a gross margin of 88.1%. The right number is 88.7%. We owe readers a second look at what the correct figure means.

The quarterly gross margin was 88.7%, against 89.3% a year earlier and 89.2% in the second quarter. It is the lowest since the first quarter of fiscal 2024. Over twelve months the margin is still 89.3%. That is a dent, not a break. But the reason for it is the one we described, and the detail is in the 10-Q. In the third quarter the cost of delivering subscriptions rose 24%, while subscription revenue rose 13.7%. The gross margin on subscriptions alone fell from about 91.2% to 90.4% (our arithmetic). Adobe now runs and pays for AI models that generate images, video and sound for its users, including models from Google, OpenAI, ByteDance, Kling, ElevenLabs and Topaz inside Firefly, according to its MAX announcements. Each generation costs money. Many of them are given away to bring in users.

QuarterGross marginNote
Q3 fiscal 202589.3%A year earlier
Q4 fiscal 202589.5%
Q1 fiscal 202689.6%
Q2 fiscal 202689.2%Semrush joins in April
Q3 fiscal 202688.7%Lowest since early 2024 (we printed 88.1%)
Subscription cost vs subscription revenue, Q3+24% vs +13.7%The AI bill

How big can the bill get? In September we wrote that if the gross margin settled at 85% instead of 89%, Adobe would earn about a billion dollars a year less. That arithmetic still holds and it is the right scale for the risk: about 4% of revenue, or roughly a tenth of free cash flow. Citi's forecast, as reported, trims next year's margin by 0.7 points, which is about $200m. The rivals show the same pattern. Figma's gross margin fell from 84% to 80% in a single quarter as its customers used more AI, according to its own release.

Why it matters less than the order book. A margin that falls from 89% to 87% still leaves Adobe among the most profitable software companies in the world, and its operating margin before stock pay is about 44%. What would matter is a margin that keeps falling while growth does not rise, because that would mean Adobe was paying for AI and getting nothing for it. So we will read the gross margin and the order book together in December. A lower margin with a stronger order book means the spending is working. A lower margin with a weaker order book means it is not.

◆
Part
V

★ Three empty chairs and a $31m sale

A new chief executive, an interim finance chief, no head of the creative business

On 1 December Anil Chakravarthy becomes Adobe's chief executive and joins its board, and Shantanu Narayen, chief executive since 2007, becomes executive chair. We described the succession in September. Since then very little has been settled. David Wadhwani, who ran the creative and productivity business, left that role on 27 September and stays on as a senior adviser. No successor has been named. Steve Day has been interim finance chief since Dan Durn left for Marvell in June, and no permanent appointment has been announced. Adobe said in September that it would file the new chief executive's pay terms in an amendment; it had not done so by 22 November. On 9 December Adobe will report with a chief executive eight days in office, a finance chief without the permanent title, and nobody named to run the business that earns most of its money.

Retention. The 10-Q filed on 22 September includes a "Form of Retention Agreement" for senior executives. It promises a year's salary and a full target bonus, a year of health cover and accelerated vesting of shares to anyone dismissed without cause, and half of a separate grant of "Retention RSUs" to those let go before 15 July 2027. It lapses a year after the permanent chief executive starts. Forms 4 show large share grants on 15 July to the chief legal officer, the chief people officer and the chief marketing officer, 31,662 shares each, worth about $7m at the time, and 22,616 shares to Day. Retention agreements are common in a succession. This one shows that the board was worried enough about departures to pay to prevent them.

The sale. On 16 and 17 September, the day we published and the day after, the Narayen family trust sold 125,000 shares at an average of about $250.76, about $31.3m. The Form 4 says the sale was "primarily made for the reporting person's tax and estate planning purposes", and it was not made under a pre-arranged trading plan. The trust still holds about 243,000 shares. A departing chief executive selling for estate planning is not evidence of bad news, and we do not read it as such. But Adobe was buying its own shares in the same weeks, at about the same price, with shareholders' money, and the person with the best view of the business was selling. Owners should notice that.

RoleWho, at 22 NovemberSince
Chief executiveShantanu Narayen until 30 Nov; Anil Chakravarthy from 1 DecBoard decision 2 Sep
Executive chairShantanu Narayen from 1 Dec
Chief financial officerSteve Day, interim15 Jun 2026
Head of the creative and productivity businessVacant (David Wadhwani left the role)27 Sep 2026
Lead independent directorFrank Calderoni (led the search)

What it means for the verdict. We lower our score for management and capital to 4 from 5. Not because anyone has done anything improper; the governance is ordinary. But in September we said the number of things that had to go right before the end of 2027 had gone up, and the people responsible for them had changed. Ten weeks later, two of those people have still not been named. Chakravarthy built Adobe's business with large companies and knows the enterprise customers well. The creative professionals, whose subscriptions are the heart of the company, will be led by someone not yet chosen.

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Part
VI

The moat, rechecked

The file formats still hold the professionals; the entry point is still being given away

The claim (September)Evidence nowVerdict
The professional standard: Photoshop, Illustrator, PremiereAt MAX Adobe let outside AI agents open and edit native Photoshop, Illustrator and Premiere files through a standard connection, and put Google's and OpenAI's models inside its own apps. The files stay Adobe's.✓ Intact
Acrobat and the PDFA Google partnership puts Acrobat inside Google Workspace (MAX release).✓ Intact
The free entry point: 100m free creative usersNo new user numbers. Firefly is now an 'AI creative studio' with dozens of outside models, most of it free to start.◆ Unproven
Pricing powerPrice rises put off since June; none announced at MAX. Citi puts the cost at ~2.5 points of next year's ARR growth (as reported).✗ Unused

We keep the moat at 6. Its centre is the same: professionals who have spent years learning Adobe's tools and whose clients, studios and printers expect Adobe's files. The most interesting decision at MAX was to open that centre to the AI laboratories rather than compete with them. Adobe now lets an outside agent, built by Anthropic, OpenAI or Google, work directly in a Photoshop file. That is a bet that the file format, not the menu, is the moat, and it is a sensible one. A business that controls the standard can let anyone build on it, as long as the work still ends in the standard.

The weak point is the one we named in September: the entry point. Adobe is giving more away to win new users, and it has chosen not to raise prices for the users it already has. Both decisions make sense for a company defending its position. But they are also what a company does when it is no longer sure of its pricing power. We will know which it is when Adobe raises prices again and we see whether customers stay.

How knowable is the next ten years?
2/5 — the cash is knowable; the growth is not. We are confident that professionals will still use Adobe's file formats in 2036 and that Acrobat will still be everywhere. We cannot say whether the next generation of designers and marketers will pay for Creative Cloud, or how much AI will cost to give away.
What you must believe to buy at $217.71
  • That owner earnings, about $21.89 a share today, do not shrink over the next decade. The price is below the value of ten years with no growth at all.
  • That AI costs leave the gross margin above about 85%, and that the free users Adobe is buying turn into paying ones over time.
  • That the buyback keeps retiring 5–7% of the shares a year, so that flat profits still mean rising profits per share.
◆
Part
VII

The competition

Figma beat its forecast; the AI laboratories became partners inside Adobe's apps

RivalWhere it meets AdobeThe latestRead
FigmaInterface and product design; now a broader creative suite.Q3 revenue $391m, +43%, $16m above the top of its forecast; adjusted operating margin +12%; full-year forecast raised again (Figma 8-K, 4 Nov).✗ Stronger
CanvaMarketing and everyday design; Affinity for professionals.No new figures since September. Made its Affinity professional design suite free (as reported).◆ Steady pressure
AI laboratories (Google, OpenAI and others)Images and video from a sentence; agents that do creative work.Now partners: their models run inside Firefly and Photoshop, and their agents can edit Adobe files (MAX release).◆ Partner and rival
Free and cheap toolsSimple edits, social posts, small businesses.The reason Adobe is giving away Firefly and Express.◆ Taking the bottom

Figma deserves a correction of tone. In September we used Figma as evidence that Adobe was the only company in its field able to afford the AI transition. Figma had grown 48% with a large operating loss. Its third quarter weakens that argument. Revenue grew 43%, its customers' spending grew 31% on the same accounts, and before stock pay it earned an operating margin of 12%. Its gross margin fell, as Adobe's did, from 84% to 80%. Figma is paying the same bill and growing faster, from a revenue base about a seventeenth of Adobe's. That does not make it a threat to Adobe's profits next year. It does mean that the best young designers, who once grew up on Photoshop, increasingly grow up on Figma.

The laboratories chose to be partners. The other change is that the AI companies Adobe feared are now inside its products. At MAX, Adobe announced Google's models in Firefly, Photoshop, Express and Premiere, Adobe tools inside Google's search, OpenAI's and others' models in Firefly, and connections that let outside agents work in Adobe files. This turns Adobe from a rival of the laboratories into a place where their models are used, and Adobe pays them for it. It is a good defence of the professional business. It also means that more of the value of each image goes to whoever supplies the model.

◆
Part
VIII

Management, insiders & capital allocation

A handover in December, one large sale, and buybacks at $235

A
Anil Chakravarthy · Chief Executive from 1 December 2026; previously President, Digital Experience
Built Adobe's business selling marketing software to large companies. Adopted a trading plan in January 2026 to sell up to 10,047 shares by 31 December 2026 (Q1 10-Q). Sets the fiscal-2027 targets on 9 December.
S
Shantanu Narayen · Chief Executive since 2007; Executive Chair from 1 December
Led the move to subscriptions. The family trust sold 125,000 shares on 16–17 September for about $31.3m, outside a trading plan, for 'tax and estate planning'.
S
Steve Day · Interim Chief Financial Officer since 15 June 2026
Described the fourth-quarter step-up in the order book as a seasonal pattern. No permanent finance chief named.

Capital allocation. In the third quarter Adobe bought back 9.5m shares for $2.23bn, at an average of about $235, and over the first nine months of the year 26.1m shares for $6.82bn, at an average of about $261. That is 91% of the free cash flow of those nine months. The shares outstanding fell from 418.6m in September 2025 to 389.2m in September 2026, a reduction of 7.0% in a year. The first-quarter purchases, at about $306, are now 29% under water; the third quarter's are 7% under water. Adobe has $24.55bn of buyback authority left until 2030, equal to 29% of its market value at today's price.

A buyback is only as good as the price paid. At $217.71 Adobe buys about $12.50 of free cash flow for every $100 it spends. Few uses of its cash would earn more, and we think the buyback is the right use of it. The company has started to fund part of it with debt. Net cash of $385m at the end of fiscal 2025 became net debt of $724m in August, after the $1.9bn Semrush purchase, and $1.35bn of bonds fall due in February and April 2027, which Adobe says it will refinance. It is a small amount of debt for a company with $10.6bn of free cash flow, but it shows the buyback is now running at the limit of the cash.

Insiders. Since 16 September the only purchase or sale of shares on the market by an insider was the Narayen trust's sale. The other Forms 4 show only shares vesting and shares withheld for tax. The last purchase was the director David Ricks's 10,000 shares at $194.51 on 25 June, which our September report did not mention.

Who owns it, and who is buying
Index funds
BlackRock 9.4% · Vanguard 7.6% · State Street 5.2%
From 13G filings in 2026, as listed in our feed; no controlling holder.
Insiders
One sale since September
The Narayen trust, 125,000 shares, $31.3m; a director bought 10,000 in June at $194.51.
The company
$2.23bn of buybacks in Q3
9.5m shares at ~$235; $24.55bn of authority left, 29% of the market value.
Analysts
Three downgrades since September
Wells Fargo, HSBC, Citi; consensus Hold, average target ~$267 (stockanalysis).
◆
Part
IX

The numbers

Twelve months to August, a cash yield of 12.5%, and six faults in our feed

Twelve months to August. Revenue was $25.97bn, up 12%. Gross profit was $23.18bn, a margin of 89.3%, and GAAP operating income $9.27bn, a margin of 35.7%. GAAP net income was $7.28bn, or $17.92 a share; adjusted earnings per share, which exclude stock pay and the amortisation of acquisitions, were $23.65. Operating cash flow was $10.81bn and capital spending only $0.21bn, so free cash flow was $10.59bn, 41% of revenue. Stock-based pay was $2.07bn, 8% of revenue, which is low for a software company. Free cash flow less stock pay, our measure of owner earnings, was $8.52bn, or $21.89 a share on the 389.2m shares outstanding.

The quarter, once more. The third quarter, to 28 August, had revenue of $6.76bn (+12.9%), subscription revenue of $6.58bn (+13.7%), a GAAP operating margin of 34.8% and an adjusted one of 44.0% (46.3% a year earlier). GAAP net income rose 3.1% to $1.83bn and GAAP earnings per share about 10% to $4.62, the difference being the buyback. Research and development rose 18.4%. These figures were right in September; we repeat them so that this report can be read on its own.

The balance sheet. Cash and short-term investments were $5.64bn against borrowings of $6.36bn: net debt of $0.72bn, less than a month of free cash flow. A $1.5bn credit line is undrawn. The 10-Q lists no new legal matters. The shareholder suit over the abandoned Figma deal was dismissed and the plaintiff is appealing, and five derivative suits remain stayed.

★ Six faults in our feed — read these before trusting a screen
What the screen showsWhat is wrong, and the number to use
Q3 cost of revenue $803m; gross margin 88.1%$40m of amortisation, an operating expense, was moved into the cost of revenue for this quarter only. The filed figures are $763m and <b>88.7%</b>. This fault produced our own first error.
Debt $6.76bn; net debt $2.40bnCounts $0.40bn of leases as debt and ignores short-term investments. Net debt is <b>$0.72bn</b>. Flagged in September; still unfixed.
Business description: three segmentsAdobe has reported a single segment since the first quarter of fiscal 2026, with two customer groups. The description is out of date.
Revenue by segment: fiscal 2024 total $36.7bnRows are duplicated and the series is out of order, so the 'latest' year shown is 2021. Revenue was $21.5bn in fiscal 2024 and $23.8bn in fiscal 2025. Do not use this series.
Analysts: 'Buy', 64 analysts; lowest target $190Inconsistent with the feed's own monthly history (40 analysts). Current sources give <b>Hold</b>, about 39 analysts, a lowest target of $140, and three downgrades since October.
Estimates: fiscal-2029 EPS below fiscal 2028An artefact of different analysts in each year ($29.45 from 11 analysts, $30.55 from 15). Treat estimates beyond fiscal 2027 as thin.
◆
Part
X

No dividend — where the cash went

Nine-tenths of the free cash flow into buybacks, and 7% of the shares retired in a year

Adobe has never paid a dividend and has given no sign that it will. For a company growing at 12% and earning these margins, that can be the right choice, provided the retained cash earns more inside the company than owners could earn with it outside. Adobe's answer has been to hand nearly all of it back through buybacks: $52.5bn since fiscal 2016, including $6.8bn so far this year. The test of that policy is the price. From 2021 to 2024 Adobe bought at 30 to 60 times earnings, and much of that money has been lost on paper. Today it buys at about 12 times GAAP earnings and 8 times free cash flow, the cheapest in at least five years.

The result for an owner is easy to see. In twelve months the number of shares fell by 7%, so each remaining share owns 7% more of the business. Stock pay of $2.07bn was offset four and a half times over. If profits stayed flat for a decade and the buyback continued at this price, earnings per share would still rise by something like 7% a year, the pace of the last twelve months. That is the strongest argument for owning Adobe now, and the reason a flat business can still be a good investment at this price.

Use of cashAmountRead
Free cash flow, 12 months$10.59bn (41% of revenue)✓ Strong
Buybacks, 12 months~$9.3bn, ~33m shares at ~$279◆ 88% of free cash flow
Buybacks by quarter, fiscal 2026Q1 ~$306 · Q2 ~$249 · Q3 ~$235Cheaper each quarter
Stock-based pay, 12 months$2.07bn (8% of revenue)✓ Offset 4.5×
Shares outstanding418.6m → 389.2m (Sep 2025 → Sep 2026)✓ −7.0%
Net cash → net debt+$0.39bn (Nov 2025) → −$0.72bn (Aug 2026)◆ Semrush and buybacks
DividendsNone, ever—
◆
Part
XI

★ Valuation

Priced below the value of a decade without growth

Fiscal-2027 consensus EPS (adjusted)
$27.41
7.9× at $217.71; the fiscal-2026 guide midpoint, $24.48, gives 8.9×.
Owner earnings per share ◆
$21.89
Free cash flow less stock pay: 9.9×, a 10.1% yield.
Free cash flow per share
$27.21
8.0×; a 12.5% yield. 43× at the end of fiscal 2021.
Net debt
$0.72bn
About $1.86 a share; $24.55bn of buyback authority left.
From 43 times free cash flow to 8Price to free cash flow at fiscal year-ends (late November / early December).43.1×FY2121.7×FY2240.5×FY2329.5×FY2413.9×FY258×NowWhat ten years are worth today$ a share; owner earnings (free cash flow less stock pay, $21.89) at 10% a year.AI takes the entry point$174Our level$200The price, 20 Nov$217.71No growth for a decade$231Central case$354Freemium converts$499★ The price is below the value of a decade with no growth at all.Sources: our price history and feed; Adobe filings; our arithmetic.

Our method. As before, we value Adobe on owner earnings, free cash flow less stock-based pay, over ten years at 10% a year, with a multiple on the tenth year. We start from $21.89 a share. We have moved our cases since September for three reasons: the corrected free cash flow, which is slightly lower; the evidence that the AI bill is real but smaller than we printed; and Figma's strength, which makes the most hopeful case a little less likely. We ignore the small net debt.

PathOwner earnings startGrowth, years 1–5 / 6–10Exit multipleValue today
AI takes the entry point$19.70 (margin to ~85%)−2% / 0%9×~$174
No growth for a decade$21.890% / 2%10×~$231
Central case ◆$21.896% / 4%13×~$354
Freemium converts$21.8910% / 6%16×~$499
What $217.71 implies$21.89~0% a year, constant10×$217.71

What is priced in? At $217.71, and with a multiple of 10 on the tenth year, the price assumes that owner earnings never grow again. With a more normal multiple of 13 it assumes they shrink by about 1.6% a year. Adobe's own guidance is for adjusted earnings per share to rise about 17% this year, and analysts expect about 12% next year. Much of that growth will come from the buyback rather than the business. Even so, the gap between a company growing earnings per share at double digits and a price that assumes decline is very large.

Why not buy it all now? Because the next seventeen days may tell us something important, and because the central case depends on growth we cannot yet measure. If growth in the first five years is 3% rather than 6%, the central value falls to about $312; if the exit multiple is 10 rather than 13, to about $313; if owner earnings fall 10% at the start because of AI costs, to about $318. All of those are still well above today's price. But December's targets will be set by a new chief executive, and a cautious first year is likely. A buyer who wants to own Adobe can buy half now at a price below the no-growth value. The other half is worth waiting for, either at a lower price or until there is better evidence.

Our level. For a business with a real moat and an uncertain growth rate we want about 40–45% off our central value of $354. That gives about $200, the level we set in July and kept in September: 8.2 times this year's adjusted earnings guidance, 9.1 times owner earnings, and close to the price at which even the case where AI takes the entry point earns about 8% a year. Buy the half now; keep the rest for below $200.

AI takes the entry point (~$174), our level ($200), the price ($218), the central case (~$354), freemium converts (~$499) — buy the half now, the rest below $200
$174
$200
$218
$354
$499
$100$600
★ Buy the half now — the rest below $200. The price is below the value of a decade with no growth (~$231); our central case is ~$354. → Interactive valuation on the company page
◆
Part
XII

Risks, lawsuits & controversies

Verified 22 November 2026 against the Q3 fiscal 2026 10-Q, 8-Ks, Forms 4 and attributed reports

Order book and new ARR fail again on 9 DecemberCautious fiscal-2027 targets from a new chief executiveAI costs on the gross marginPrice rises deferred; pricing power unprovenNo permanent CFO; no creative headFigma growing 43%; Canva's free toolsBuybacks at the limit of cash; $1.35bn due in 2027Figma-deal suit on appeal; derivative suits stayed

Legal. The 10-Q lists no new matters. The securities suit over the abandoned Figma acquisition was dismissed in March 2025, permission to amend was refused in November 2025, and the plaintiff has appealed. Five shareholder derivative suits are stayed. The FTC and Justice Department case over Adobe's cancellation terms was settled in March 2026.

Governance. The board adopted retention agreements for senior executives during the succession, the outgoing chief executive's trust sold $31.3m of shares outside a trading plan, and the new chief executive's pay terms had not been filed by 22 November.

★ How we will know — six dated tests
TestTodayWhat would change our mind
Order book (RPO), 9 December$22.16bn, +8%Above $24.77bn (+10%) passes; below $24.24bn (last year's jump repeated) would be a clear second miss.
Net new ARR in the fourth quarterTarget implies ~$0.78bnAbove last year's ~$0.92bn passes; well below $0.78bn would mean Adobe missed its own target.
Fiscal-2027 targetsConsensus revenue +9%, EPS +12%ARR growth targeted below ~7% would confirm a slower business; we would then buy only at the level.
Gross margin88.7% (Q3)Below 87% without a stronger order book would mean AI is costing more than it earns.
LeadershipInterim CFO; creative head vacantStrong permanent appointments by the spring would lift our management score.
The price$217.71Below $200 with the tests no worse than Adobe's own targets: complete the position.
◆ PART XIII · To our shareholders
The Letter ⓘ

In September I told you to keep accumulating Adobe at two hundred and fifty dollars, at half the size I would have chosen in July, and to add toward two hundred. Since then the company has said almost nothing, and the shares have fallen thirteen per cent, almost exactly as much as every other software company. A reader who followed me is down thirteen per cent on that half and has not yet bought the second.

Let me start with what I got wrong, because I got more wrong than I would like. My letter opened with a gross margin of eighty-eight point one per cent. The real figure was eighty-eight point seven. The direction was right and the size was double, and I built a paragraph on it. I also overstated the free cash flow, misdated a remark by the chief executive, and quoted a phrase I cannot now find in the company's transcript. Six details in all, corrected in this report. None of them changes the verdict, but you are entitled to numbers you can trust, and this time I gave you some that were too dramatic.

Now what has not changed. On the ninth of December Adobe will show its order book and the recurring revenue it added in the autumn. I said those were the numbers to watch, and I still think so. I have done the arithmetic on Adobe's own targets, and if the company hits them exactly, both numbers will be weaker than a year ago. So I expect the test to fail a second time. A new chief executive, eight days in the job, will then set targets for next year, and new chief executives seldom promise much in their first week.

So why buy at all? Because of the price. At two hundred and eighteen dollars you pay about eight times the free cash flow, and the company spends almost all of that cash retiring its own shares at the same low price. Seven per cent of the company disappeared in a year. If Adobe's profits never grow again, the shares are still worth more than you are paying. For the price to make sense as a poor investment, the business has to shrink. The professionals are not leaving. The order book is growing more slowly, not falling. And the company has just opened its file formats to the AI companies that were supposed to replace it.

There are things that make me uneasy. The chief executive who chose the strategy sold thirty-one million dollars of shares the day I published, while the company bought at the same price. Two of the people who will run the business for the next three years have not been named. And a rival I described as struggling grew forty-three per cent last quarter. None of these alone is a reason to sell. Together they are a reason not to be in a hurry.

My verdict is the September verdict, at a lower price and with fewer illusions. Buy the half now. Keep the other half for below two hundred dollars, or for a December report that is better than I expect. If the fiscal-2027 targets show recurring revenue growing more slowly than about seven per cent, I will still buy at two hundred, because the price will pay for the risk, but I will not pay more.

— The Buffett Lens. When a company's tests are about to fail and its price already assumes it will never grow, the question is not whether the news will be bad but whether the price already allows for it.

▲The Bull Case
★★ Priced below a decade of no growth — 8.0× free cash flow, a 12.5% yield, 7.9× fiscal-2027 consensus earnings; at 10× the tenth year the price implies owner earnings never grow; a no-growth decade is worth ~$231.
★ The buyback does the compounding — 9.5m shares bought at ~$235 in Q3; shares outstanding −7.0% in a year; stock pay offset 4.5×; $24.55bn of authority left, 29% of the market value.
★ The centre holds — revenue +12.9% and subscription revenue +13.7% in the last quarter; twelve-month gross margin 89.3%; outside AI agents now work inside Adobe's file formats rather than around them; net debt only $0.72bn.
▼The Bear Case
★★ The tests will probably fail again — the order book needs a +$2.61bn Q4 jump against +$2.08bn last year; Adobe's own 10.2% ARR target implies net new ARR ~−15%; Citi expects ARR growth of ~5% next year (as reported).
★ Leadership gaps and a large sale — a chief executive from 1 December, an interim finance chief since June, no head of the creative business; retention agreements; the outgoing chief executive's trust sold $31.3m outside a trading plan.
★ Costs and rivals — subscription costs +24% against subscription revenue +13.7%; price rises deferred; Figma +43% with a positive adjusted margin; three analyst downgrades since October.
Buy the Half —
the Rest Below $200
A cash machine whose forward tests will probably fail again on 9 December, priced as if it will never grow. ★ At $217.71 — 8.0× free cash flow and below the ~$231 value of a decade without growth — the price sits well under our central value of ~$354, within a range of ~$174 (AI takes the entry point) to ~$499 (freemium converts). Buy half a position now; keep the rest for below $200, about 44% below our central value. Watch the order book, net new ARR and the fiscal-2027 targets on 9 December.
⚡About 44% below our central value and close to the price at which even the bad case earns 8% a year. Add the $200 price trigger to your Watchlist.
◆ The Buffett Lens · Dividend Line Research · As of 22 Nov 2026 · Price $217.71 (20 Nov close) · Follow-up to our 16 Sep 2026 X-Ray
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Disclaimer: This is an editorial analysis for information and education, not investment advice, and not a recommendation to buy or sell any security. ⚠️ Price and market data are from our live data pull of 22 November 2026; the price used is the 20 November close. Results, the order book, recurring revenue, guidance, debt, buybacks, the retention agreement, management changes, insider sales and litigation are from Adobe's releases, Forms 10-Q, 8-Ks and Forms 4, and management remarks from Adobe's own corrected call transcripts; Figma's results from its 8-K; analyst actions, consensus figures and the causes of market moves are from press and data services, as marked. The valuation paths, the implied fourth-quarter figures and the subscription margin are our own arithmetic. This report corrects six details in our September X-Ray. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Do your own research or consult a licensed adviser.
Dividend Line · X-Ray Analyses — written in the house methodology