The margin of safety
Graham called it the central concept of investment. In plain terms it's a gap between what you pay and what you think you're getting, wide enough to survive your own mistakes.
Room for being wrong
Engineers who rate a lift for 1,000 kg don't expect anyone to load it with 990. They build in slack, because their calculations won't be perfect and neither will the people using the lift. Graham asked investors to do the same thing with price.
Any estimate of what a business is worth rests on guesses about the future, and some of those guesses will be wrong. Pay well below your estimate and they can be off by a fair amount while you still come out fine. Pay close to it and you need to be right.
“The function of the margin of safety is, in essence, that of rendering unnecessary an accurate estimate of the future.”
He gave the idea the last chapter of the book, titled "Margin of Safety" as the Central Concept of Investment. If you only read one chapter of The Intelligent Investor, read that one.
The same mistake at two prices
Brenton Foods (illustrative) is a steady packaged-food maker. Your careful estimate of its value is $50 a share. It turns out you were too optimistic by a quarter, and the business is really worth $37.50. Here's how that one error lands at two purchase prices.
Same company, same 25% error. The price alone turned a loss of more than a fifth into a gain. That's the margin of safety doing its job.
Where Graham looked for it
The middle row needs a word. In chapter 20 Graham argued that when a stock's earnings yield sits well above what high-grade bonds pay, the difference piles up in your favour year after year. Here's the reasoning with our own round numbers.
That extra 50 cents per dollar, earned whether it's paid out or reinvested, is a cushion that can absorb a bad patch. It only works if the earnings are real and fairly stable, which is why Graham wanted a long record before he trusted them.
Why one margin isn't enough
Graham was clear that a margin of safety improves the odds without guaranteeing any single result. A company bought at a big discount can still go bust. What the margin offers is that, across many such purchases, the gains should outweigh the losses.
So he paired it with diversification. For his defensive investor he suggested owning at least ten companies and no more than about thirty. A margin of safety on one stock is a bet. On twenty-five, it starts to look like arithmetic.
When the value comes down to meet the price
A margin is measured against a value, and values move. In a shrinking business the value can fall toward your purchase price faster than the price climbs toward the value. Investors call this a value trap.
The arithmetic at the start was fine. The $50 was a snapshot of a business heading down.
Growth is the other weak point. Graham was wary of any margin that depended on forecasts, so his tests lean on past earnings and on assets. Buffett, his best-known student, later argued (with a push from Charlie Munger) that a wonderful business at a fair price could carry its margin inside its future growth. Both views can be right, for different companies. Lesson 5 comes back to this.
Takeaways
Sources for this lesson
- Benjamin Graham, The Intelligent Investor (1973), chapter 20, "Margin of Safety" as the Central Concept of Investment
- Benjamin Graham, The Intelligent Investor (1973), chapter 5, The Defensive Investor and Common Stocks
- Seth Klarman, Margin of Safety (1991)
- Warren Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway letter to shareholders (1989)