Interest coverage and the maturity wall
Leverage says how big the debt is. Coverage says whether this year's profit can carry it, and the maturity schedule says when the lenders want their money back.
Can profits pay the interest?
At 1×, every dollar of operating profit goes to the lenders. Below 1×, the company is paying interest out of savings or new borrowing, and that can't last. Most careful investors want a wide cushion. Somewhere around 5× is comfortable for an ordinary business, and lenders start to get nervous near 3×.
The EBITDA version makes sense where depreciation of buildings and networks is the biggest cost, as at property companies and utilities. Everywhere else it flatters. Machines wear out and have to be replaced with real cash, so a company that needs constant capital spending should be judged on EBIT.
How far can profit fall?
A ratio is easier to judge as a question about the business: how far could operating profit fall before coverage hits a level you'd worry about?
So the real question about Hollis is whether its operating profit has ever fallen 40% in a year. Freight volumes swing with the economy, so look at its record through 2009 and 2020 before you call 5× safe.
The maturity wall
Coverage quietly assumes the debt stays put. It doesn't. Bonds and loans have end dates, and when one arrives the company has to repay it or borrow again, at whatever rate lenders charge that month.
The debt note in the annual report lists how much falls due in each of the next five years and after. Our annual report course shows where to find it. A maturity wall is a large share of that debt falling due in a short window. Here is Hollis's schedule.
Over the next three years $900 million falls due. Hollis has $120 million of cash and keeps about $90 million a year of free cash flow after dividends. By the end of year three its own money adds up to 120 + 3 × 90 = $390 million, or 43% of what's due. The other $510 million has to be borrowed again.
Borrowing again at a higher rate
Plenty of companies locked in cheap money in 2020 and 2021. The US Federal Reserve then took its policy rate from near zero in early 2022 to above 5% by the middle of 2023, and bond yields climbed with it. Debt issued at 2% or 3% started falling due into a much dearer market.
Nothing about the trucks or the customers changed. The cushion shrank from a 40% fall in profit to 16% because of a date printed in a bond agreement.
What coverage misses
- Floating-rate debt. Bank loans often reset with market rates every few months, so the bill can rise with no maturity at all.
- Capitalised interest. A company building a plant can add the interest to the plant's cost, so the income statement shows less than was paid. The cash flow statement or its notes give interest actually paid.
- Net interest. Some companies net off the interest earned on their cash, which stops working once the cash is spent.
- One good year. Like leverage, coverage uses a single year's profit. Look at the worst year of the last decade too.
Walls II and III
The interest cover wall is worth 20 points: 14 for coverage today and 6 for the worst year of the last decade. Full marks need 10× now and 5× in that worst year. REITs and utilities are measured on EBITDA and allowed lower cover, for the reason given above.
The wall (the third tower) is also worth 20. It takes the debt falling due over the next three years from the 10-K's maturity table and sets it against cash plus three years of free cash flow after dividends, exactly the Hollis sum. Full marks need the company's own money to cover 150% of what's due. Without a table it can tie back to the balance sheet, the wall is left out of the score, unless the company's own money would repay all of its debt with room to spare.
The Runway chart on the Fortress tab, which is free, draws both lines year by year: debt due, added up, against the company's own money. Where the debt line climbs above, the gap is what the company would have to borrow again.
Takeaways
Sources for this lesson
- Martin Fridson and Fernando Alvarez, Financial Statement Analysis: A Practitioner's Guide (4th edition, 2011)
- Edward I. Altman, Edith Hotchkiss and Wei Wang, Corporate Financial Distress, Restructuring, and Bankruptcy (4th edition, 2019)