Investing written the way we would explain it across a table: what the number means, why it moves, and what an owner should do about it. Every article links down to the company pages and the X-Ray reports that carry the evidence.
A moat is a reason competitors cannot reach you. It fails the moment someone arrives who does not need to come the way you are defending.
Opinion, with the evidence attached: what is actually happening inside a business people are arguing about.

The market still prices this company on the business that is dying. Two-thirds of the profit now comes from the two that are not — and one of them is growing 20%.

The index treats them as a sector. Their accounts say otherwise — and this year the difference has started showing up where it matters most, in the cash.

A low price is the easiest thing in the world to find and the hardest thing to interpret. There is one question that separates a bargain from a trap, and it is not about the multiple.

Defence looks like the safest business on earth: a government customer, decade-long contracts, no competition. Our industrials reports average 5.86 — our lowest sector. Here is why.

Everything about healthcare looks like a wonderful business until you notice who sets the price — and that it is almost never the company that invented the thing.

Both are extraordinary businesses riding the same wave. They are not, however, the same investment — and the thing that separates them is a number you can count on one hand.

Charlie Munger called the price the trouble with Costco and never sold a share. Both halves of that sentence are instructive, and most people only quote one.

A bank is the one business where the balance sheet is the product. JPMorgan's just produced a record — and its own chairman told you why it will not repeat.

A patent expiry is the rarest thing in investing: a large, certain loss with a date attached. Which is exactly why the market gets it wrong in both directions.

Nvidia earned in six months what it took the whole of last year to earn. That is not the interesting part. The interesting part grew faster than revenue did.

The SEC does not classify SpaceX as an aerospace company. It classifies it under data processing — and the first set of public accounts explains why.

The share price has halved and the explanations are all vibes: brand fatigue, On and Hoka, China. The accounts say something more specific, and it was hiding inside a headline everyone read as good news.

The bear case used to be that AI makes Photoshop unnecessary. The September numbers retired that argument and replaced it with a duller, more dangerous one.

Every business school teaches growth. Almost none teach the harder discipline: how to run something profitable that will be smaller every year for the rest of its life.
Yield, safety, growth — and how to tell a durable payout from a trap.

Two completely different things are being discussed as if they were one: a contractual clause that is small and knowable, and a negotiation that is neither.

A long record does not stop bad years happening. It changes what they mean — and the work is separating the problems with an end date from the ones without.

Everyone watches for the cut. The far more common ending is quieter: the dividend is never cut, the streak is never broken, and the increases shrink to nothing.

Cuts feel sudden. They almost never are. In every case in our library the arithmetic ran out of room years before the board admitted it — in public, in the filings.

The dividend is paid by the barrel. The share price is set by events nobody can forecast. Owning one means accepting that those are two different things.

Everyone says growth beats yield. The arithmetic agrees, and then adds a detail nobody mentions: it takes two decades, and most people are not investing for two decades.

Everyone learns the rule: own it before the ex-date and the dividend is yours. Almost nobody is told what the market does to the share price that same morning.

Twelve cheques a year instead of four is a genuine convenience. It is not a genuine edge — and the screen that starts with 'monthly' is selecting for something other than quality.

A payout ratio above 100% would be a red alert at any normal company. At a REIT it is the default, and the reason is an accounting entry that costs nobody a cent.

A high yield is not a reward for patience — it is usually the market's way of saying it does not believe the payout. Here is how to check, in the order that matters.
What a business is worth, and what you are being asked to pay for it.

The punishment for buying a wonderful business too dear is not a loss. It is a decade of being right about the company and getting nothing for it.

With a cyclical, the price-to-earnings ratio is lowest exactly when the shares are most dangerous — and highest when they are cheap. Here is the way round it.

It is excluded from the figure the company leads with, excluded from most screens, and paid entirely by you. The cheapest fix in investing is to add it back.

The thing every value investor says they are waiting for almost never looks like they imagined. It arrives attached to falling guidance, and it feels like a mistake.

Utilities get bought as bonds that grow. They are not bonds at all — and the three numbers a screener shows you about one are all category errors.

A screener is a very fast way to be confidently wrong. The ratio can be right and the model wrong, the model right and the data wrong — and every failure tends to point the same way.

A buyback is not a reward to shareholders. It is the company buying its own stock — and like any purchase, everything depends on the price paid.

People argue about whether a stock is expensive. The more useful question has an answer: what would have to be true for today's price to be right?

The question people ask is 'why is it down?'. The question that pays is 'which of the three kinds of down is it?' — because two of them are traps and they look identical from the outside.
Why some businesses keep their profits and others give them away.

Scarcity and pricing power produce identical numbers for a year or two. Then capacity arrives, and only one of them is still there.

A brand is not awareness, affection or a logo people recognise. It is a quantity: the price you can take without losing the customer. It shows up in two numbers.

It is the idea Berkshire Hathaway was built on, and almost nobody explains it properly. Borrowed money is expensive. Float is money you are paid to keep.

Most moats are a matter of degree. This one is a matter of kind: there is no second supplier, there is no substitute, and there has been no serious attempt in twenty years.

Everyone claims a durable advantage. Inflation is the audit: it asks every company the same question at the same time, and the gross margin publishes the answer.

Everyone can define a moat. Far fewer can tell you which companies have one, which is why it is worth counting rather than theorising.
Position sizing, holding periods, and the behaviour that decides returns.

Cash is not a forecast and it is not cowardice. It is an option on future prices — and for the first time in fifteen years, you are paid to hold it rather than charged.

Discipline is supposed to protect you. Sometimes it is simply a way of being right about a company and owning none of it, and the only honest thing is to price that too.

It is the most over-read signal in investing. Insiders buy for reasons that have nothing to do with what the shares are worth — and the most famous buys are often the least informative.

Some risks get smaller when you own more things. A few do not get smaller at all, and for those there is exactly one tool — and it is not diversification.

We have re-examined eight companies and lowered our score on six of them. Not one became a sell — and the reason is the most useful thing we have learned about selling.

The maths of diversification has a very clear answer, and almost nobody's portfolio reflects it — in either direction.

Most arguments against trading are about psychology. The stronger argument is arithmetic, it is not close, and you can work it out on the back of an envelope.
Rates, cycles and sentiment — read as an owner, not a trader.

If software is priced per person and the work stops needing people, the arithmetic looks grim. The place to check is not the theory — it is the renewal rate.

A research house is the last place you would expect an honest answer to this. So here is ours, with our own scorecard attached and nothing removed.

Enormous sums are moving. Following where they settle, rather than where they are announced, separates the businesses collecting cash from the ones committing it.

Every record is made of two things: what you earned and what the tide gave you. Companies report the total. Separating them takes one subtraction.

A hurdle rate is not an opinion. When the safest asset available pays 5.12%, every other asset has to explain itself — and most of ours currently cannot.

Forget whether the market is expensive. Our own scores say something more actionable: the gap between two companies in the same sector is twice the gap between sectors.

Property is supposed to be the simple part of a portfolio: buy buildings, collect rent, get paid. Three things sit between the rent and your return, and only one of them is in the news.